People are often surprised to learn that suing the officer and suing the department are two different lawsuits with two different sets of rules.
If a deputy broke your arm during an arrest, the claim against that deputy is one thing. The claim against the county that trained him, supervised him, reviewed his prior uses of force, and cleared him each time is something else. Understanding the difference explains why some cases name a single officer and others name a city, a police chief, and a department all at once.
QUICK ANSWER: A city or county is not automatically liable for what its officers do. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services (1978), a public entity is liable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 only when its own policy, longstanding custom, failure to train, or a final policymaker’s decision caused the violation. The tradeoff is significant: qualified immunity protects individual officers, but it does not protect the entity.
The rule that starts everything
In Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that municipalities are “persons” who can be sued under section 1983. In the same decision it closed a door. A city cannot be held liable simply because it employs someone who violated your rights.
The legal shorthand is that there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983. In ordinary employment law, an employer is generally responsible for what an employee does on the job. Section 1983 does not work that way. To reach the entity, you have to show the entity itself did something.
The four routes to entity liability
Courts generally recognize four ways to get there.
An official policy
The most direct route, and the rarest. A written policy, ordinance, or regulation that itself causes the constitutional violation. Departments rarely write down anything this useful, but policies on things like when to deploy a police dog, when to use a carotid restraint, or how long to hold someone before arraignment sometimes do the work.
A longstanding custom or practice
More common, and harder to prove. Here the argument is that a practice is so widespread and settled that it has the force of policy even though nobody wrote it down. This is built from patterns: repeated incidents of the same kind, complaints that were consistently dismissed, uses of force that were consistently found to be within policy.
Failure to train or supervise
Under City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), a failure to train can be a basis for liability where that failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of people the officers encounter. The Supreme Court set a demanding standard in Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011), generally requiring a pattern of similar violations that put the entity on notice, with a narrow exception for situations where the need for training is patently obvious.
Ratification by a final policymaker
Under Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), a single decision by an official with final policymaking authority can bind the entity. In police cases this often takes the shape of a ratification argument: a chief or sheriff reviewed a use of force, knew the facts, and approved both the conduct and the reasoning behind it.
Why this matters when qualified immunity is in the case
Qualified immunity shields an individual officer from damages unless the right violated was clearly established at the time. It is the single most frustrating doctrine in this area of law, and we have written about it at length in our discussion of qualified immunity and SB 2.
Here is the part that gets overlooked. Qualified immunity is a personal defense. Municipalities do not get it. An entity cannot argue that its policy was not clearly established as unconstitutional in the way an individual officer can argue about their own conduct.
That does not make entity claims easy. The causation and deliberate indifference showings are genuinely difficult. But it does mean the entity claim can survive in cases where the individual claim is at its weakest, and that is not a small thing.
The evidence these cases are built from
Monell claims are won with records, and a striking amount of the relevant material is public or obtainable.
- Peace officer conduct records. Penal Code section 832.7, as amended by SB 1421 and SB 16, makes several categories public, including sustained findings of dishonesty and of unreasonable force, and records of uses of force causing death or great bodily injury.
- Critical incident video. Government Code section 7923.625 requires release of video from shootings and serious force incidents within 45 days, subject to limited delays.
- Stop data. Agencies report stop information to the California Department of Justice under the Racial and Identity Profiling Act.
- Training materials, policy manuals, and use of force reviews, obtained in discovery once a case is filed.
- Prior complaints and prior lawsuits against the same agency and the same officers.
- Audits, consent decrees, grand jury reports, and inspector general findings where they exist.
The picture that emerges from those records is either a department that identified a problem and corrected it, or a department that saw the same thing happen repeatedly and did nothing. That contrast is the heart of a Monell case.
California adds a second track
Federal law is not the only option. Under California’s Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 52.1, public entities can be vicariously liable for their employees’ conduct under state law principles, which is a meaningfully different structure from Monell. Many cases plead both, and our article on qualified immunity versus the Bane Act walks through why.
There is a deadline that comes with the state law track. A claim against a California public entity generally must be presented in writing within six months under Government Code section 911.2. Federal section 1983 claims in California borrow the state’s two year personal injury limitations period, but the six month claim requirement is the one that catches people.
One more development worth knowing
In Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353 (2025), a unanimous Supreme Court rejected the “moment of threat” approach that some courts had used to evaluate police force by looking only at the final seconds before it was used. Courts must consider the totality of the circumstances, including what led up to the encounter.
That matters for entity claims, because tactics, training, and decisions made minutes earlier are now squarely part of the analysis rather than something a court can wave away.
Frequently asked questions
A claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against a city, county, or other public entity, based on the entity’s own policy, custom, failure to train, or a final policymaker’s decision, rather than on the fact that it employed the officer.
No. Section 1983 does not allow liability based on the employment relationship alone. You have to connect the harm to the entity’s own policy, custom, training failure, or ratification.
No. Qualified immunity is a defense available to individual officials, not to public entities.
A demanding standard meaning the entity knew of, or the need was obvious as to, a risk of constitutional violations and consciously disregarded it. It is more than negligence.
Usually through public records requests under Penal Code section 832.7, prior complaints and lawsuits, agency policies and training materials obtained in discovery, and stop and use of force data.
Sometimes, under the narrow route recognized in Canton and Pembaur, for example where a final policymaker made or ratified the decision, or where the need for particular training was patently obvious. Most cases still rest on a pattern.
The California government claim requirement, generally six months under Government Code section 911.2, applies to state law claims against public entities. Federal section 1983 claims in California borrow a two year limitations period. Both can be running at once.
That depends entirely on the facts and the available records. Many cases name both, because the claims are governed by different rules and can succeed or fail independently.
If you are considering a case against a police department or sheriff’s department in Southern California, the Law Office of Jerry L. Steering handles federal civil rights lawsuits against officers and the entities that employ them. Call the Newport Beach office at (949) 474-1849.
About the Author
Jerry L. Steering has represented people injured by law enforcement since 1984. He graduated from the University of Georgia School of Law in 1984 and has been licensed in California since 1986 (State Bar No. 122509). His Newport Beach practice covers police misconduct, civil rights, and criminal defense throughout Orange, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, Ventura, Santa Barbara, and Kern counties.
This article is general legal information, not legal advice about your situation. Reading it does not create an attorney client relationship.
Sources
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)
- Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986)
- Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011)
- Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353 (2025)
- 42 U.S.C. section 1983
- California Civil Code section 52.1 (Tom Bane Civil Rights Act)
- California Government Code section 911.2
- California Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1
- California Penal Code section 832.7, as amended by SB 1421 and SB 16
- California Government Code sections 7923.625 and 12525.5
Steering Law is a California-based civil rights and criminal defense firm led by Jerry L. Steering, Esq. The firm focuses on police misconduct cases, including excessive force, false arrest, malicious prosecution, contempt of cop incidents, and 42 U.S.C. §1983 civil rights actions, while also handling serious criminal defense matters. Steering Law is dedicated to protecting clients’ constitutional rights and delivering justice for individuals who have been wronged by law enforcement.
