Category: Jerry Steering Misc Cases in California

Victorville – Apple Valley Police Brutality Attorney

Jerry L. Steering arguing before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in police shooting case, Pasadena, California

Jerry L. Steering, Esq., is a Police Misconduct Attorney, who defends criminal cases, and sues police officers for, among other things, the use of excessive force upon civilians (otherwise known as police brutality.) His law practice involves serving, among other places, San Bernardino County, and the San Bernardino County cities shown below; especially Victorville and Apple Valley; the two “hot spots” for outrageous police misconduct. Although the Victor Valley is not nearly as heavily populated as other areas in Southern California, the “crime rate” of crimes and Constitutional Torts committed by the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department is astounding. It seems that the Victor Valley is the hotbed for “cops gone wild.” These deputies in the High Desert are simply out of control, and nobody is going to do anything about; at least anybody from the Sheriff’s Department, or the Judges of the Victorville Court. These deputies “up the hill” have even been caught by a News Helicopter, beating-up a man who tried to elude them on horseback. The deputies knew that there was a Sheriff’s Department helicopter above, them, and knew that those pilots and crew would never “rat them out”. So, the beat the man who was trying to surrender to them after he had been tased. See, “Sheriff Orders Immediate Internal Investigation Into Arrest Seen on “Disturbing” Video”.

Mr. Steering also represents persons in both civil and criminal case in Los Angeles County, San Diego County, Riverside County and Orange County. He is an expert in brutality / excessive force and false arrest cases; both civil and criminal. Mr. Steering has successfully sued San Bernardino County police agencies successfully, for many years now. Here are a few examples of cases that Mr. Steering has won against the San Bernardino County Sheriff Department; an agency that has literally gone off of the deep end in the High Desert / Victor Valley area:

Morgan v. County of San Bernardino, U.S. Dist. Court, Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Riverside) (1996), $714,000.00 settlement following jury verdict for excessive force and false arrest during search warrant execution in Apple Valley, California;

Austin v. County of San Bernardino, U.S. District Court, Central District of California, $500,000.00 jury verdict for false arrest and excessive force;

Lopez v. County of San Bernardino, U.S. Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Riverside) (2002), $50,000.00 settlement for racially motivated battery;

Miller v. City of San Bernardino, et al, U.S. Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Riverside) (2003), $35,000.00 settlement for unlawful detention;

Calderon v. County of San Bernardino, U.S. Dist. Court, Central Dist. of Cal. (Riverside)(2003), $115,000.00 settlement for false arrest and illegal search;

Arroyo v. City of San Bernardino, U.S. Dist. Court, Central Dist. of Cal. (Riverside)(2004), $125,000.00 settlement for unreasonable seizure of person;

Ford v. County of San Bernardino, (2007), $80,000.00 settlement for excessive force;

In re Jane Doe v. County of San Bernardino, et al., (2008), $290,000.00 settlement (prior to filing lawsuit) for sexually motivated mistreatment of arrestee; and

Aubry v. County of San Bernardino, et. al, U.S. Dist. Court (LA) 2012, $325,000.00 settlement for the use of unreasonable force and for false arrest.

Penny Trent v. County of San Bernardino, et al.,U.S. Dist. Court (LA) 2012, $600,000.00 settlement for  unreasonable force, false arrest and unlawful search of residence.

LEGAL EDUCATION AND PUBLICATIONS.

University of Georgia School of Law (founded 1859)

Having attended the University of Georgia School of Law (J.D. 1984), and having taken and passed the February 1984 Georgia Bar Exam in his last semester of Law School (while Clerking at a law firm full time and attending law school full time), in June of 1984 Mr. Steering began defending criminal cases for the law firm of Scott & Quarterman, of Athens, Georgia; the same law firm that he clerked for, full-time, for.

Since 1984 (in California since 1986) he has tried and litigated hundreds of criminal cases, including murder cases, manslaughter cases, assault and battery cases, towing industry related auto-theft / extortion cases (i.e. drop fees), drug possession / drug manufacturing cases, vehicular homicide cases, white-collar investor fraud cases, sex-offender or drug addict registration cases, violations of court order cases, domestic violence cases, towing industry cases, and the entire spectrum of various criminal violations.

Mr. Steering is also a published legal scholar, and has a published Law Review Article about a logical quandary of federal evidentiary law: the disparity in the use of “accomplice accusations” between Fourth Amendment scrutiny of “accomplice accusations” (i.e. typically deemed “reliable” enough to obtain search warrant or arrest warrant), and Sixth Amendment scrutiny of the very same statement (i.e. accomplice accusation generally held inherently unreliable for “Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause” purposes. In fact, these statements have been held to be so inherently unreliable that Congress could not even have meant to have included them with the ambit of the Declaration Against Penal Interest exception to the hearsay rule [804(b)(3)].) See, “The Application Of Sixth Amendment Tests For The Reliability Of Hearsay Evidence To Probable Cause Determinations, Steering and Ponsoldt, 16 Rutgers Law Journal 869 (1985).

NOTABLE CRIMINAL CASES IN SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, THAT MR. STEERING TURNED AROUND INTO CIVIL CASES.

Penny Trent

Penny Trent v. County of San Bernardino, et al.

On June 3, 2012, at approximately 3:30 p.m. San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Sheriffs Carolyn Chadwell and Kirsten Mitchell answered a call for service of a husband beating his wife at their home at 12486 Kiowa, Apple Valley, California [1]. The deputies received no response to their knocking on the Penny and Wayne Trent’s door, so they entered the house and found Penny Trent and her husband partially undressed in the bathroom [2].  Rather than leave the residence once the welfare of the residents was confirmed, Deputies Chadwell and Mitchell interrogated them about the call for service (i.e. the domestic violence call.) After discussing the incident with Penny and Wayne Trent, the Deputies decided to arrest Mr. Trent for felony corporal injury on a spouse (Penal Code Section 273.5), handcuffed him and put him in their patrol car.

When the deputies took Mr. Trent out to the patrol car to go to jail, they told Penny Trent to have a seat in the living wait in the living room, and they’d be right back. Deputies Chadwell and Mitchell placed Mr. Trent into the patrol car, and Deputy Chadwell returned to the residence with a Marsy’s Victim’s Card [3]; the brochure that is given to Domestic Violence victims [4] by police officers.

When Deputy Chadwell returned to the door of the home with the Marsy’s Card for Mrs. Trent, she saw

SBSD Deputy Sheriff     Carolyn Chadwell

Penny Trent sitting on her living room couch. The couch appears at an angle to the front door area (See below, photo of view of couch from front door.) Deputy Chadwell apparently could not see one of Penny Trent’s lower arms when she saw her and stated to her: “Penny; where’s your other arm.” In literally less than one second after asking that question, Deputy Chadwell shot Penny Trent twice in her left leg. Although the bullets grazed her leg, Penny Trent was horrified from being shot, and at a complete loss as to why Deputy Chadwell would shoot her. This is all audio recorded [5]; a copy of the audio shown below.

Deputy Chadwell claimed that she shot Penny Trent because when she reentered the Trent residence, she saw Penny Trent with a blank stare on her face and said that Mrs. Trent’s hand was under a couch pillow. Mrs. Trent’s hand was just resting on the pillow on the couch, but from the front doorway area, Deputy Chadwell could only see her right hand. Deputy Chadwell didn’t give Mrs. Trent a chance to respond to her question, or to show her left arm. She just shot her within one second of asking her where her left arm was. Neighbor witnesses told the Sheriff’s Department that Deputy Chadwell then broke-down and cried about having shot Mrs. Trent.

Immediately after Deputy Chadwell shot Mrs. Trent, Deputies Chadwell and Mitchell ordered Penny Trent to exit her residence, and when she did, the deputies threw her to the ground on the rock front lawn, handcuffed her and placed her into their patrol car; imprisoning her there.

Audio recording by Deputy Chadwell of the June 3, 2012 shooting incident (the shooting takes place at 17 min. 02 sec. of the audio recording.)

Click here to view entire SBSD Officer-Involved-Shooting Investigation Report of Penny Trent Shooting

Thereafter, several Sheriff’s Department supervisors and other officers came to the Trent residence and decided what to do with Mrs. Trent [6]. After discussing the shooting of Mrs. Trent with each other, the Sheriff’s Department then conspired to take Penny Trent to the Apple Valley Station, so they could interrogate her in a coercive manner [7]; to try to get her to say something to try to justify their shooting of her [8] (she never did.) It’s a federal crime and federal constitutional violation to take a person to the police station for questioning, without probable cause to arrest them (Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985)). That’s just what they did to Penny Trent, and it’s shown on the recording shown below.

Notwithstanding Mrs. Trent’s repeated requests to leave the station, the Sheriff’s Department investigators kept Penny Trent at the station. They even created police reports showing that a crime had occurred (i.e. Cal. Penal Code § 245; assault with a deadly weapon), that Penny Trent was the “suspect” of the shooting, and that Deputy Chadwell was the “victim”. The geniuses at the Sheriff’s Department did a gunshot residue test on Penny Trent, even though she was the one shot. Even worse, the investigators at the Apple Valley station made Penny Trent undress down to her underwear, to take photos of any marks or bruises on her; supposedly for the criminal case against Mr. Trent.

Moreover, to add insult to injury, the Sheriff’s Department (Investigator Robert Thacker) unlawfully obtained a search warrant for the search of Penny Trent’s house, and used the bogus pretense of a criminal investigation, to perform their civil liability investigation. This was the Sheriff’s Department’s only chance to inspect the premises, as police officials cannot obtain a search warrant to do civil liability investigation; only to investigate crimes. Therefore, the Sheriff’s Department had to misrepresent the purpose of their application for a search warrant to Judge Stanford Reichert; claiming that their search would reveal evidence of a crime (the only crime really being Chadwell’s shooting of Penny Trent.)

Eventually, in the early morning hours of June 3, 2012, the Sheriff’s Department drove Mrs. Trent home after they were done with their illegal search of her residence.

Although ever since O.J. Simpson decapitated his wife “Domestic Violence” seems to be the worst crime that one can commit, because the Sheriff’s Department shot the domestic violence victim (Penny Trent), when they took Mr. Trent to the hospital that same evening, they posted no guard in / at his hospital room, and actually let him “escape.” To date, no criminal charges have been filed against Mr. Trent, because the Sheriff’s Department can’t prosecute Mr. Trent without publically implicating themselves in shooting the very victim of that crime.

None of this is surprising, save the actual shooting itself. Police agencies typically arrest the victims of their outrages, and in the coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation, attempt, and often succeed, in getting their victims to make statements against their interest; statements that “spin” the facts or otherwise somehow shift all or part of the blame to the citizen – victim. This is normal, notwithstanding it being obvious to any peace officer that it’s unlawful to take someone to the police station for questioning in the absence of probable cause for their arrest. See, Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985.) The ends that the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department will go to, to protect themselves from civil liability is incredible.

Moreover, although the Sheriff’s Department just couldn’t keep themselves from illegally taking Penny Trent to the police station in handcuffs (i.e. false arrest, kidnapping civil rights criminal violations), because they screwed up and shot the victim that they were there to save, they need to get a coerced and skewed statement of what happened. They need to get Penny Trent to the station there and now, even though they had no right to have done so, because the coercive environment of police interrogation, allows the cops to shape the story, and to get you to agree with statements that are not true and that are against your interest, because after that moment in time, you are going to not be so vulnerable, and will likely have a lawyer.

Notwithstanding all of that, the Sheriff’s Department didn’t get an actual formal statement from Deputy Chadwell, until five days after her attempt to kill Penny Trent; an audio copy of her interview being below and playable. Case Result: $600,000.00.

People of the State of California v. Jonathan Osborne; Rancho-Cucamonga San Bernardino County Superior Court criminal action for violation of Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1) (resisting / obstructing / delaying peace officer.) Jonathan Osborne’s mother had ordered a suicide kit from a lady in San Diego, who the FBI had raided for selling the kits. The FBI found an unfilled order for the kit, so the feds called the Upland (California) Police Department to check on the welfare of the parents at the Osborne home. When the Upland Police Department showed-up at the Osborne home, the only person there was Jonathan Osborne; one of the Osborne’s sons. The police demanded entry into the home and arrested (and beat-up) Jonathan Osborne, for refusing to consent to the police officers’ demand to make a warrantless entry into the Osborne home. Notwithstanding the fact that a 1974 California Supreme Court case (People v. Wetzel, 11 Cal.3d 104 (1974)) held that it is never a crime to stand in one’s doorway and to refuse their consent to a warrantless search of one’s home, the Crimes Against Peace Officers Unit of the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office refused to dismiss the case, because they have an express policy of never dismissing cases alleging a police officer victim. Moreover, the Upland Police Department destroyed an exculpatory audio recording of the incident that was recorded by the main Upland Police Department officer. Result: Case settled on appeal by defendants for confidential sum.

People of the State of California v. James Lemoine; Rancho-Cucamonga San Bernardino County Superior Court criminal action for felony assault on a peace officer and felony interference with public officer’s performance of duties. An Ontario Police Officer located Mr. Lemoine in a neighbor’s home after incident with his girlfriend, resulting in her called police on him. Mr. Lemoine attempted to flea the officer and attempted to jump through window of home to escape. Mr. Lemoine got stuck in the window sill assembly, and was shot in the back by the Ontario Police Department officer while in that position. He posed no threat to the officer, who was exonerated of wrongdoing by Ontario PD (“What’s wrong with shooting an unarmed man, stuck in a window frame, cut-up, with one leg outside and one leg inside?”) The officer claimed that Mr. Lemoine attacked him in an effort to escape; a complete fabrication; something actually quite normal for peace officers. However, the only people who get to sit on juries in police misconduct cases, civil or criminal, have not personally witnessed police misconduct (all that have seem to always tell the court during jury selection, that the event of police misconduct that they witnessed had such a profoundly negative opinion and general distrust of, if not contempt for, peace officers, that they are actually prejudiced against peace officers in these type cases, and are, therefore, excused to sit for cause as a juror.) Therefore, the only people who are asked to judge who is lying; the defendant or the Constable, are people who believe that police don’t do bad things to people who didn’t deserve it; morally, if not legally, because they have only had positive experiences with peace officers. That’s why it’s so difficult to win in these officer vs. civilian swearing contests; notwithstanding the Constable repeatedly lying on the stand. However, it can be done, and it was done here. Hon. Ben T. Kayashima, Judge Presiding:  Jury Verdict: Not Guilty all Counts.

People of the State of California v. Tom Austin; Rancho-Cucamonga San Bernardino County Superior Court criminal action for resisting / obstructing / delaying peace officer. Mr. Austin’s 16 year old son and his classmates were video recording a reenactment of the famous Sacco an Vanzetti armed robbery incident (that Sacco and Vanzetti were innocent of, but executed for), for a High School History project. The boys wore black ski masks and carried pellet guns, and had dressed-up the Austin’s garage to resemble a bank teller window counter. Some neighbors saw the youths and (notwithstanding a youth recording the reenactment with a tripod mounted video camera outside of the garage) thought that the youths were home invasion robbers, and called the police.

The youths were detained downstairs in the garage, and when Mr. Austin heard screaming (the police screaming orders to the youths) he walked downstairs to tell the youths to be quiet (to not to disturb the neighbors), and when he reached the bottom of the stairs and turned a blind corner, he saw the barrel of a policeman’s pistol pointing directly at and in front of his face. The officer ordered Mr. Austin to turn around, and when he asked the officer (who was now standing inside of Mr. Austin’s home) what was going on, the officer pepper-sprayed him in his face, handcuffed him and took him to jail. The Ontario Police officers concocted the story that Mr. Austin lunged for the officer’s gun, and that’s why he pepper-sprayed him. Mr. Steering found that a recording of the immediate post pepper-spraying activities, had been altered to conceal the true contents of the discussion between Mr. Austin and the officers. Hon. Gerard S. Brown, Judge Presiding: Result: Jury Verdict: Not Guilty (Mr. Steering later obtained a $500,000.00 jury verdict in favor of Mr. Austin, against the arresting officers, as shown below.)

People of the State of California v. Milt Holland; Rancho-Cucamonga San Bernardino County Superior Court criminal action for resisting / obstructing / delaying peace officer. Mr. Holland leased the old CHP office building in Ontario, to work on prototype bus control computer system. Ontario Code Enforcement wanted to check the building to see if Mr. Holland also was residing in the same. The area was only zoned for commercial occupancy; not residential. Ontario Code Enforcement officers, along with Ontario Police Officers, approached the chained-closed padlocked rear entry entry gate of the premises, and saw Mr. Holland behind the gate; elevated; standing in a construction trailer. The officers ordered Mr. Holland to open the gate, and Mr. Holland simply walked away from the locked gate, and into the building. The officers used the “master key” (i.e. bolt cutters) to enter the yard, and arrested Mr. Holland and took him to jail for violation of Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1); resisting / obstructing / delaying a peace officer in the performance of their duties; the catch-all crime that the police use when they don’t actually have any grounds to arrest a civilian, since Section 148(a)(1) is so nebulous and ambiguous, it could be, and many many times has been, construed as meaning just about anything, and is used to arrest people who “fail the attitude test”) Click on tab, above on “Criminal Attorney – Contempt of Cop Resistance Cases”, for a more developed analysis of police misuse of Section 148(a)(1.)

After Mr. Holland had gone through four criminal defense lawyers, who told him to plead guilty to misdemeanor delaying / obstructing an officer (Section 148(a)(1), for not opening the gate), Mr. Holland retained Mr. Steering, who look one look at the Ontario PD report and immediately knew that even on the face of the Police Report, that there was no crime committed by Mr. Holland. On the day set for trial, Mr. Steering asked Judge Dennis G. Cole to dismiss the case on the ground that if everything that the police were contending in their reports was true, it nonetheless is never a crime to refuse an officer’s demand to search a place, thing or person, in the absence of a search warrant. If reading Mr. Steering legal authorities to support that proposition of law (See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (both holding that the state can’t criminalize a mere refusal to consent to warrantless entry), Judge Cole told the District Attorney’s Office that his “case was in the toilet”. Result: Case Dismissed pursuant to Mr. Steering’s invitation to the Court, to dismiss the case on its own motion, in the interest of justice (Cal. Penal Code § 1385.)

JANE and JOHN DOE v. County of San Bernardino, U.S. Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal. [Riverside] (2000); $50,000.00.

Deputy Sheriff Attempts To Frame Husband And Hide Romance Wife, By Hiding The Drugs Found On Her From The DA’s Office:

In this case, Mr. Steering obtained $50,000.00 from the County of San Bernardino, for a criminal defendant’s claim against the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department, for planting evidence of drug manufacturing, during the deputy’s unlawful search of a probationer’s residence; notwithstanding probation Bravo search terms. While in the process of planting evidence, the deputy sheriff actually discovered even better evidence of the very crime that the deputy sheriff was attempting to frame the defendant for. It’s like framing the guilty. That way, the police don’t need to bother with obtaining evidence against the persons who they believe are engaged in ongoing criminal enterprises (i.e. manufacturing or selling narcotics); they can just provide the evidence themselves, and save us all of the time and money incurred and expended, in investigating and obtaining competent and admissible evidence of criminal conduct that will stand-up in court.

When a San Bernardino County Probation Officer and Sheriff’s Department Investigator did a probation search of JOHN DOE’s residence (the “husband” was on felony drug possession probation), they saw all sorts of pornographic photos, exotic clothing and sex toys in the home, and became immediately infatuated with the beautiful occupant of the residence; JANE DOE; the cohabitant girlfriend. The Sheriff’s Department Investigator arrested JANE DOE for narcotics possession, and took her to jail; stopping on the way to jail to show-off his “catch.” Although her bail was $500,000.00, the Investigator got it reduced to release on her own recognizance (something unheard of in San Bernardino County), to attempt to date her.

The Investigator broke back into the DOE residence after arresting JANE DOE, as he had seen a VHS video at the home earlier marked: “XXXX.” When the Investigator then played that video at the DOE residence, he not only watched JOHN and JANE DOE having all sorts of sex, but also saw a recording of JOHN DOE cooking meth. However, there was no meth manufacturing chemicals or equipment at the house. So, in an effort to frame the guilty, the Investigator planted meth “cooking” equipment in the residence, and he and the Probation officer staked-out the house for several days, until JOHN DOE showed back-up at his home. When JOHN DOE entered the house, he was immediately arrested for meth manufacturing, based on the items planted by the Investigator, who wanted to put JOHN DOE in prison, to free-up JANE DOE for dating.

Mr. Steering was able to obtain $50,000.00 for the defendant from the County for the Investigator’s actions, and Mr. Steering was able to negotiate a 10 year sentence for JOHN DOE, rather than the 25 years to life sentence for a third strike drug manufacturing.

POLICE BRUTALITY, FALSE ARRESTS AND MALICIOUS CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS.

Wrongful police beatings, accompanied by their sister “false arrests”, are a common and every day occurrence. These beating / arrests are no longer limited to persons of color. Soccer Moms, airline pilots and school teachers, beware: because of the great (and ever expanding) powers being given to police officers by the Supreme Court, described below, in a very real way, you no longer have the right to question, protest or challenge police actions, since to do so usually results in your being physically abused and falsely arrested on trumped of charges of essentially, “Contempt Of Cop”; (i.e. maybe not getting on the ground fast enough, or failing to walk-over to the officer fast enough; some type of failing the attitude test.) These beatings of innocent by police officers is rampant and condoned and defended by the command structure of most, if not all, modern police agencies. See, Orange County Sheriff’s Department police torture videos, and other police beating videos throughout the Country. There is a “Blue Code of Silence” between and among peace officers throughout the nation, and everyone knows this. This is no startling revelation. The County of Los Angeles has itself released a public document, acknowledging the existence of, and actually condemning, the Sheriff’s Department’s own rogue gangs of sadistic jailers at the Los Angeles County Central Men’s Jail. See, The Citizens Commission on Jail Violence September 28, 2012.

IN CALIFORNIA, A POLICE OFFICER CAN BEAT-UP OR MURDER ANYONE THAT THEY WANT TO, ANY TIME THAT THEY WANT TO, WHILE ON-DUTY.

The use of unreasonable and unlawful force in America is so rampant, that in these modern times, at least in California, a police officer can murder anyone that they want to, any time that they want to. Juries are very reluctant to convict police officers for any sort of duty related actions, such as shooting civilians. In 2010, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Shot 15 Unarmed People To Death – “Perception Shootings”. See p. 56 of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 30th Semi-Annual Report to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors.

All that the police officers need to say is the they were afraid for their lives because their shooting victim had his hands in his pockets, or that his hands were under his body and wouldn’t show them to the officer, or that he was reaching for his waistband area. The modern police line is that if an officer either can’t see your hands or if you reach for you waist or pockets, that it’s okay to shoot the person. This is no joke. None of the shootings of the fifteen unarmed people who were shot to death by the LA Sheriff’s Department in 2010 were found by the department to have violated department policy. Moreover, none of those deputies were criminally prosecuted for those shootings; even when witnesses have come forward and disputed the deputies’ claims as to what happened.

These homicides by police officer aren’t just limited to shootings. For example, on January 13, 2014, an Orange County, California, Superior Court jury acquitted two Fullerton Police Department officers of murdering / using unreasonable force on the mentally-ill son of a former Orange County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Sheriff; Kelly Thomas. The beating death was audio and video recorded, and no reasonable human being could have believed that the beating death was justified. The video recording shows two sadistic police officers, beat Kelly Thomas to death. However, the defense was able to show the jury two prior incidents that made the jury simply not care that Kelly Thomas was wrongfully beat to death; the testimony about his having previous struck his grandfather, and testimony about his mother obtaining a restraining order against him. Remember, this was a mentally ill young man, who had his moments. They were able to do this, because California Evidence Code Section 1103 permits a criminal defendants to show the character of the alleged victim of their crime, to prove that the victim has a certain character, and that the victim acted in conformity with that character during the incident complained of; the one that the criminal defendant is being prosecuted for.

Accordingly, notwithstanding overwhelming evidence that the Fullerton Police Department literally beat Kelly Thomas to death for what seemed to be actual sadistic gratification (i.e. “See these fists. They are going to fuck you up”), a Fullerton training Corporal gets on the witness stand and testifies that he has seen the video and audio recording of the officers beating Kelly Thomas to death and that the actions of the officers are commensurate with their training. Incredibly, the jury get suckered. The police, the lawyers, the judges and the professional police apologists (the “expert witnesses that really can justify literally anything) all know how outrageous Kelly Thomas’s murder was. They are all, however, bound by our system of justice.

The police get to show the sordid life of their victims because of Cal. Evid. Code § 1103(a) allows the criminal defendant to show various traits of the character of the alleged victim to show that the alleged victim acted in conformity with that traits of character during the incident complained of. By the time that the cops are done dehumanizing the dead victim, no one on the jury cares what the officer did to the decedent.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES HAVE GOTTEN MORE BRUTAL.

In 2012, a retired Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Captain, Bob Olmsted, told the Los Angeles Times, that the L.A. County Men’s Central Jail was, essentially, a torture chamber, run by these rogue jailer gangs of sadistic sociopaths (Minnesota Viking logo tattoos on on their ankles.) Discipline for beatings was not existent, and torturing inmates was actually required for jailer gang initiation. See, “L.A. County sheriff’s official tells of jail brutality”, LA Times, July 7, 2012. See also, “L.A. County jail violence sheriff’s fault, panel says”, LA Times, September 28, 2012. Rival Sheriff’s Department jailer gangs even got into a rumble between the “3000 Boys” (the third floor jailers) and the “2000 Boys” (the second floor jailers) at a Sheriff’s Department Christmas party.

Even as long ago as 1992, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in a published decision that the “Vikings” gang of Deputy Sheriff’s at the Lynwood Sheriff’s Station, that they were a Neo-Nazi white supremacist gang within the LA County Sheriff’s Department. See, Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, et al., 978 F.2d 504 (1992.)

The leader of the sociopath / sadistic torturing faction of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, recently retired LA Sheriff’s Department Undersheriff Paul Tanaka, is now running for Sheriff of LA County. Paul Tanaka was a member of the Nazi Sheriff’s Department gang the “Vikings”; who have the Minnesota Vikings logo tattooed on their legs.

Following Captain Bob Olmsted’s revelations to the FBI, the FBI did an undercover investigation at the Los Angeles County Men’s Central Jail. The FBI investigation resulted in the Indictment of 18 Deputy Sheriffs and their Supervisors for torturing inmates and obstructing the FBI’s investigation by hiding prisoners in the county jail population. These 18 Indictments of Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department personnel resulted in the resignation of L.A. County Sheriff Lee Baca.

Former Undersheriff Paul Tanaka, along with a retired LASD Captain, were indicted on May 13, 2015 by a federal Grand Jury for Obstructing and Conspiring to Obstruct a federal Grand Jury investigation of the rampant torturing of inmates at the Los Angeles County Jail (See, Paul Tanaka Indictment of May 13, 2015.)

That’s not the end of it. Former LASD Deputy Sheriff Noel Womack pleaded guilty in June of 2015 to federal charges of lying to the FBI about systemic LASD torturing and framing of inmates at the Los Angeles County Jails. In 2014, six LASD Deputy Sheriffs were convicted of obstructing the FBI’s investigation of the torturing of prisoners at the Los Angeles County Jails.Lee Baca resigned from office over the scandal at the LA County Men’s Central Jail involving the Indictment of 18 LASD Deputy Sheriffs and their Supervisors for torturing prisoners and obstructing the FBI’s investigation of the same.

On February 10, 2016, Sheriff Baca was Indicted for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2); lying to the FBI regarding his knowledge of a scheme in the Sheriff’s Department to intimidate an FBI agent who was investigating complaints of beatings of inmates by deputies at the Los Angeles County Jail, and to hide an FBI informant – jail inmate from his FBI handlers. Sheriff Baca was tried on that Indictment, but the jury hung.

Thereafter, on April 6, 2016, former LASD Undersheriff Paul Tanaka was convicted of conspiracy and actual obstruction of an FBI investigation; violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiring to obstruct justice) and 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (obstructing justice); for not only obstructing an FBI investigation into years of beatings and torturing of inmates at the L.A. County Jail, but also Tanaka and other high ranking Sheriff’s Department officials threatened one of the FBI agents involved in that investigation with arrest for continuing that investigation. In his trial, Tanaka admitted that he still had the Minnesota Vikings Logo tattoo on his leg; a tattoo that he described as a member in a club; the “Vikings”; a tatoo that the federal courts have held is the gang taoo for a “neo-Nazi white supremacists gang within the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. See, Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504 (1992).

Thereafter, on February 10, 2017, former Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca was convicted of similar charges; lying to the FBI and obstruction of the FBI investigation into the systemic beatings and torture of inmates at the Los Angeles County Jail;  violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2); lying to the FBI regarding his knowledge of a scheme in the Sheriff’s Department to intimidate an FBI agent who was investigating complaints of beatings of inmates by deputies at the Los Angeles County Jail, and to hide an FBI informant – jail inmate from his FBI handlers.Nonetheless, the body politic tolerates the existence, and the perpetuation of an ongoing unwritten agreement among and between peace officers, to falsely report, and, if necessary, to thereafter conspire with officers who they may not yet even know, to falsely testify, about event(s), if the potential or apparent criminal, administrative and civil liability of a fellow officer is at stake. After all, in the primary category of cases that truly are “false arrests” in the most malevolent sense of the word, “Contempt of Cop cases“, the only reason that there’s an arrest of a civilian at all, is because the police officer has beaten-up / tortured another; usually to self-medicate rather their frail and easily bruise-able egos.

Orange County, California had a Sheriff’s Department that was run by Sheriff Mike Carona, who was released from federal prison in 2015 for witness tampering (instructing witness to lie to Grand Jury.) Until Sheriff Carona went to prison, Orange County was a fantasy assignment for those truly sadistic peace officers, who “get-off” on beating inmates and arrestees. Carona’s Assistant Sheriffs, George Jaramillo and Don Haidl were both criminally prosecuted.

Mike Carona was the former head Orange County Marshall before the Sheriff’s Department took over Court Services, such as bailiffs in the Court rooms. He was never a line / street cop. When Sheriff Carona ran for Sheriff his campaign and political tactics were influenced to commit unlawful acts by the same two Gentlemen who did the same with the 1998 campaign for District Attorney. Gabriel Nassar and Eugene Abbadessa convinced both newly elected Sheriff Carona and newly elected District Attorney Tony Rackauckas both “sold” bages (Carona; Deputy Sheriff’s badges [Reserve]) and “Commissioner” badges (for the Tony Rackauckas Foundation) for a $5,000.00 “constribution”.

Modern police agencies are afraid of losing their “power” in, and over, a community. That “power” base (i.e. ability to influence the politicians and the public), is based in large part, on the public “supporting the police”. That popular support is based upon a belief by the body politic, that: 1) police officers are well trained and know and respect your Constitutional rights, 2) they’re basically honest, 3) that only a small percentage of them would commit perjury, 4) that the force that the police use on people is almost always justified (if not legally, then morally), and 5) that the police are capable of policing themselves. Although none of these beliefs are accurate, one cannot ignore the belief system of the majority of the white / affluent American populace, in understanding why police officers routinely, and without a second thought, falsely arrest civilians, and commit other outrages against innocents.

Unfortunately, because of institutional pressures (i.e. “ratting out fellow officer not a good career move), and the obvious political and practical consequences of not backing-up the their fellow police officers, the norm in today’s police profession, is for police officers to falsely arrest their “victims”, and to author false police reports to procure the bogus criminal prosecutions (i.e. to literally “frame”) of those persons whose Constitutional rights and basic human dignity have been violated. After all; how would it look if a police officer beat you up, and didn’t arrest you. Because most police officers, including those that step-over Constitutional “line in the sand“ (i.e. beating another, falsely accusing civilians of crimes), are not true sociopaths, when they falsely charge you with a crime, it isn’t usually too serious of one. Most are bogus claims for violation of Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1), because the crime of “resisting or obstructing or delaying a peace officer who’s engaged in the performance of his/her duties” is incredibly ambiguous, and can (ingenuously or ignorantly) be applied to almost any conduct by a person (i.e. the defendant yelled at me for restraining [torturing] the “suspect”, so he delayed me from arresting the “suspect” because I had to look his way and take a protective stance in the events that the defendant charged at me.)

Often, Contempt of Cops arrests also often charge violation of Cal. Penal Code §§ 242 / 243(b); “battery on a peace officer”. Battery on a peace officer, is almost always, in reality, battery by a peace officer; otherwise known as “Excessive Force” or “Unreasonable Force”, which the United States Supreme Court has classified since 1989, as an “unreasonable seizure” of a person under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (See, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).)Moreover, if the police beat you up badly, they usually charge you with violation of Cal. Penal Code § 69; using or threatening the use of force to prevent or to attempt to prevent, a public officer from performing their duties. They use this section to charge you with for more serious injuries to you by them, because Section 69 is a “wobbler offense”; a crime that can be charged as a misdemeanor or a felony.

Accordingly, in many cases where the police use “excessive force” (“police brutality”) on civilians, the excessive force victims get criminally prosecuted, for crimes that they didn’t commit; usually for crimes such as “Resisting / obstructing / delaying a peace officer in the lawful performance of their duties (Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1)), assault on a peace officer (Cal. Penal Code §§ 240 / 241) and resisting officer with actual or threat of violence (Cal. Penal Code § 69.) After all, how would it look if the police beat-up a civilian, and just left the scene, as opposed to arrested the person that they just beat-up? Not very good for the police; ergo, the old police motto: “You hook’em, you book’em.”

Pursuant to the routine procedure to persecute their victims, police officers arrest their victims, author bogus reports that accuse their victims of crimes against the officer, preserve evidence favorable to them, and “flush” evidence adverse to their usually fabricated and contrived claims of criminal conduct by their victims; you, the public. His law practice involves serving, among other places, Orange County, and the Orange County cities shown below. Mr. Steering is an expert in dealing with your pending bogus criminal action, in a way that is going to best protect your ability to down the road sue the police, and obtain compensation and redress for your beating, your false arrest, and your malicious criminal prosecution. Mr. Steering also specializes in obtaining evidence and framing issues for adjudication in the initial criminal action against the police misconduct victim (the defendant being criminally prosecuted), and discovering evidence in that criminal case, to seal the police defendants’ fate in the civil action after the criminal case is disposed of in your favor.

LEGALLY, WHAT IS EXCESSIVE / UNREASONABLE FORCE?

Prior to 1989, the federal courts looked to the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution to “pigeon hole” claims of excessive force by a peace officer against civilians. See, Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2nd Cir. 1973.) That standard was that the conduct of the police officer had to be “shocking to the conscience”; the standard still used for those uses of force by a police officer that don’t involve efforts by police to use force against civilians to seize them, such as arresting or detaining civilians. Johnson v. Glick involved the use of force by prison guards against a convict; not either a free civilian that an officer is trying to “seize” (detain or arrest), or a “pre-trial detainee“; someone who has already been “seized” (i.e. arrested, and in the County Jail; awaiting arraignment, other pre-trial proceedings, or trial.)

However, when it comes to a police officer using force to arrest or detain another, the standard for the use of force is decreed by the Supreme Court, to emanate out of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

Amendment IV.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

Thus, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is, since 1989, the legal standard by which to judge whether a police officer used excessive force when seizing a civilian.

WHAT IS EXCESSIVE / UNREASONABLE FORCE?

The United States Supreme Court has defined “Excessive Force”as follows:

Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy, author of the Majority Opinion in Graham v. Connor

“Where, as here, the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right “to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures” of the person . . . . . . . Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ” ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ ” against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Id., at 8, 105 S.Ct., at 1699, quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 22-27, 88 S.Ct., at 1880-1883. Because “the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mecha ical application,” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), however, its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S., at 8-9, 105 S.Ct., at 1699-1700 (the question is “whether the totality of the circumstances justifies a particular sort of . . . seizure”).” (See, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989.))

“The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. See Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S., at 20-22, 88 S.Ct., at 1879-1881. The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause, even though the wrong person is arrested, Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971), nor by the mistaken execution of a valid search warrant on the wrong premises, Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987). With respect to a claim of excessive force, the same standard of reasonableness at the moment applies: “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,” Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d, at 1033, violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.

As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, however, the “reasonableness” inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. See, Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-139, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723-1724, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978); See also, Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S., at 21, 88 S.Ct., at 1879 (in analyzing the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure, “it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard”). An officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional. See, Scott v. United States, supra, 436 U.S., at 138, 98 S.Ct., at 1723, citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973).

In Graham, we held that claims of excessive force in the context of arrests or investigatory stops should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment‘s objective reasonableness standard, not under substantive due process principles. 490 U.S., at 388, 394. Because police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation, id., at 397, the reasonableness of the officers belief as to the appropriate level of force should be judged from that on-scene perspective. Id., at 396. We set out a test that cautioned against the 20/20 vision of hindsight in favor of deference to the judgment of reasonable officers on the scene. Id., at 393, 396. Graham sets forth a list of factors relevant to the merits of the constitutional excessive force claim, requir[ing] careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id., at 396. If an officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely to fight back, for instance, the officer would be justified in using more force than in fact was needed (See, Saucierv. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), Kennedy, J.)

The federal courts have reduced all of this legal gobbledygook to jury instructions, that, supposedly, a person of regular intelligence can understand. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Jury Instruction for excessive force instructs the jury:

“Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instructions

9.22 PARTICULAR RIGHTS—FOURTH AMENDMENT—UNREASONABLE SEIZURE OF PERSON—EXCESSIVE (DEADLY AND NONDEADLY) FORCE

In general, a seizure of a person is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if a police officer uses excessive force [in making a lawful arrest] [and] [or] [in defending [himself] [herself] [others]. Thus, in order to prove an unreasonable seizure in this case, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the officer[s] used excessive force when [insert factual basis of claim].

Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may only use such force as is “objectively reasonable” under all of the circumstances. In other words, you must judge the reasonableness of a particular use of force from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene and not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.

In determining whether the officer[s] used excessive force in this case, consider all of the circumstances known to the officer[s] on the scene, including:

1. The severity of the crime or other circumstances to which the officer[s] [was] [were] responding;

2. Whether the plaintiff posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officer[s] or to others;

3. Whether the plaintiff was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight;

4. The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be necessary;

5. The type and amount of force used;

[6. The availability of alternative methods [to take the plaintiff into custody] [to subdue the plaintiff;]

[7. Other factors particular to the case.]“

THE PROBLEM WITH GRAHAM’S “REASONABLE OFFICER STANDARD” IN THE REAL WORLD – THE WATCHMAN GETS TO MAKE HIS OWN RULES THAT REGULATE HIS OWN CONDUCT.

When asked about a 1974 Papal Encyclical by Pope Paul VI, condemning the use of contraception, former Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz stated: He don’t play-a-da game; he don’t make-a-da rules.” In the police profession, they do play that “game”, and now they get to “make-a-da rules.”

The problem with the description of how “excessive force” is defined, is not the Supreme Court’s strong emphasis on the officer’s conduct being based on an “objective” standard; they hypothetical reasonable officer in the abstract. The problem is, that the standards in the police profession for what is “reasonable” or otherwise proper police conduct in a given situation, are generally neither the creature of legislation (i.e. state law requiring the audio recording of custodial police interrogations) nor the product of any judicially created mandate, duty, or prohibition (i.e. Constitutional limits on conduct and judicially created “exclusionary rule”.) The conduct of “the objectively reasonable officer”; that standard that the Supreme Court attempted to describe in Graham v. O’Connor and Saucier v. Katz, is created by the very persons whose conduct the Fourth Amendment is supposed to impose limits on. Thus, in a very real sense, the Supreme Court has set the standard (“objectively reasonable officer”) that the Fourth Amendment requires, but has delegated the details of what’s reasonable or not, to the police.

It’s letting the regulated enact their own regulations. It’s like letting the local power company, set the rate of profit that they should make; set the formula for how the amount of profit is determined; set how much they can spend on public relations (since they’re a monopoly), and how, when, by whom and in what manner, they should be inspected, what they can and can’t do in their industry, and every other aspect of the business. If they want to all use tasers on civilians, then that’s reasonable. If they all want to pepper-spray persons because their hands in their pockets, then that’s reasonable. If they want to prone-out everyone at gun point that they detain, then that’s reasonable. At the end of the day, in the real world police world, if the technique, method, procedure, policy or practice reduces the danger level to the officer, you can bet that, eventually, they will find a way to justify such technique, method, procedure, policy or practice , and make such otherwise unreasonable behavior, “reasonable”, for no other reason than the police would prefer to act that way; Constitutional or not. You see the problem. The police have an old slogan: “It’s better to be judged by 12, then carried by 6.” It’s another way of saying, I’ll act in a way that is in my self interest; not yours, and if I happen to trample your Constitutional rights, so be it. My insuring my safety from any potential threat trumps any annoying Constitutional rights of yours.

THE PROBLEM OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, COMPOUNDS THE PROBLEM CREATED BY GRAHAM.

In a nutshell, the Qualified Immunity is an immunity from a lawsuit (from being sued at all) for violation of a civilian’s Constitutional rights, when those rights were actually violated, but a reasonably well trained police officer could have believed that his conduct did not constitute a Constitutional violation. So, even if the police officer actually violated your Constitutional Rights, he/she may be immune from suit, because the law was not clearly established enough at the time of the violation, to hold a police officer liable for his conduct. This is a doctrine “contrived” by the conservative members of the Supreme Court (since 1981), to ensure that you can’t do anything about (or at least do a whole lot less about) your Constitutional Rights being trampled by the government.

THE PERVERSION, AD NAUSEAM, OF THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE, TO PROTECT PEACE OFFICERS FROM CIVIL LIABILITY; “REASONABLY ACTING UNREASONABLY”

So, for example, if the police come-up with a whole new technique to restrain people, such as a with a taser, or pepper-spray, or pepper-balls, or water-balls, or hobbling (police hog tying), or a shock-belting, or stun-gunning, the officer may very well be entitled to qualified immunity from being sued for the misuse of any of the above-mentioned devices; not because its “reasonable”, but because the police just use those devices in such manners; thereby giving the Courts an excused to relieve the police officer from liability for the damage caused by his violation of the Constitutional Rights of civilians:

Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy (appointed by President Reagan in 1988 and confirmed in 1989)

“Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. Saucier v. Katz,533U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)) . . . Accordingly, we must resolve immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation. Pearson, 129, S.Ct.at 815.

An officer will be denied qualified immunity in a 1983 action only if (1) the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury, show that the officers conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the incident such that a reasonable officer would have understood her conduct to be unlawful in that situation. Saucier, 533 at 201-02; Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011.) To assist the development of constitutional precedent, we exercise our sound discretion to follow Saucier’s conventional two-step procedure and address first whether the Torres Family has alleged the violation of a constitutional right. See, Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 818.

The qualified immunity analysis involves two separate steps. First, the court determines whether the facts show the officers conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001.) If the alleged violate a constitutional right, then the defendants are entitled to immunity and the claim must be dismissed. However, if the alleged conduct did violate such a right, then the court must determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged unlawful action. Id.

A right is clearly established if a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Id., at 202. If the right is not clearly established, then the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. While the order in which these questions are addressed is left to the courts sound discretion, it is often beneficial to perform the analysis in the sequence outlined above. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818 (2009.) Of course, where a claim of qualified immunity is to be denied, both questions must be answered.

When determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact at the summary judgment stage, the court must take all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. In the context of qualified immunity, determinations that turn on questions of law, such as whether the officers had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to support their actions, are appropriately decided by the court. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993.)

However, a trial court should not grant summary judgment when there is a genuine dispute as to the facts and circumstances within an officers knowledge or what the officer and claimant did or failed to do. Id. (Saucier v. Katz, supra.)”

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IS A SELF-FULFILLING POLICY; THE COURT’S DON’T PROVIDE EITHER REASONABLY DISCERNIBLE GUIDELINES, OR CLEAR BORDER TYPE RULINGS.

The problem with the description of how “excessive force” is defined, is not the Supreme Courts strong emphasis on the officers conduct being based on an objective standard; the hypothetical reasonable officer in the abstract. The problem is, that the standards in the police profession for what is reasonable or otherwise proper police conduct in a given situation, are generally neither the creature of legislation (i.e. state law requiring the audio recording of custodial police interrogations) nor the product of any judicially created mandate, duty, or prohibition (i.e. Constitutional limits on police conduct, such as the judicially created exclusionary rule.) The conduct of the objectively reasonable officer; that standard that the Supreme Court attempted to describe in Graham v. Connor and Saucier v. Katz, is created by the very persons whose conduct the Fourth Amendment is supposed to impose limits on. Thus, in a very real sense, the Supreme Court has set the standard (objectively reasonable officer) that the Fourth Amendment requires, but has delegated the details of what’s reasonable or not, to the police.

This is quite problematic, as the Bill of Rights was created for the Courts to protect us from the police / government, so when the police define “what’s reasonable force”, in a very real way, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, one of those rights in the Bill of Rights, is defined by the police, rather than the Courts. There are cases where the Courts will step-in and ban a particular police practice, but those cases are far and few between, and when the Courts do so, they often create more of legal mess than existed before such judicial intervention.

Circuit Kim McLane Wardlaw wrote Majority Opinion in Bryan v. McPherson

See, for example, the trilogy of Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals taser cases. In the first case, Bryan v. McPherson (9th Circuit 12/28/09), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that using a taser on a man in his underwear who was 20 feet away and merely verbally going-off on the police officers, was so obviously unlawful, that no reasonably well trained police officer could have believed that it was constitutional to tase the man.

Two weeks later, in Mattos v. Argarano (9th Cir. 1/12/10), another three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the police tasing of a domestic violence victim did not constitute unreasonable force, since the police were trying to grab the her husband, and she happened to just be between the man and the police.

Judge Richard A. Paez wrote Majority Opinion in Mattos v. Agarano

The Mattos court held that their decision didn’t conflict with the Bryan v. McPherson (9th Circuit 12/28/09), because the use of the taser in that case was so obviously unreasonable, that the defendant police officers would not be entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

Circuit Judge Cynthia Holcomb Hall wrote Majority Opinion in Brooks v. City of Seattle

Thereafter, two and one-half months later in Brooks v. City of Seattle (9th Cir. March 26, 2010), the Ninth Circuit held that it didn’t constitute the use of unreasonable force for a police officer to tase a pregnant woman three times in her neck to get her out of her car.

Having now painted themselves into a corner, the Ninth Circuit decided to grant “en banc review” of all three 2010 taser cases; one en banc panel of judges decided the rehearings of the Mattos v. Argarano and Brooks v. City of Seattle cases, and one en banc panel reheard the Bryan case. The results were almost as confounding, as were the original wrongly decided decisions. In the Mattos and Brooks cases, the Ninth Circuit held that although the defendant police officers did violate the plaintiffs’ Constitutional right to be free from the use of unreasonable force upon their persons (i.e. the tasers), that the officers were nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity from suit, because the law on the use of tasers was not clearly established at the time of the Constitutional violations:

We now hold that, although Plaintiffs in both cases have alleged constitutional violations, the officer Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs 1983 claims because the law was not clearly established at the time of the incidents.

In the rehearing on the Bryan v. McPherson case, the Ninth Circuit reversed themselves, and awarded qualified immunity to the defendant officers; also because the law regarding the use of tasers was not clearly established at the time of the Constitutional violations:

“Officer MacPherson appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. We affirm the district court in part because, viewing the circumstances in the light most favorable to Bryan, Officer MacPhersons use of the taser was unconstitutionally excessive. However, we reverse in part because the violation of Bryans constitutional rights was not clearly established at the time that Officer MacPherson fired his taser at Bryan on July 24, 2005.”

WHY THE POLICE CRIMINALLY PROSECUTE THEIR VICTIMS.

Unfortunately, because of institutional pressures (i.e. “ratting out fellow officer not a good career move), and the obvious political and practical consequences of not backing-up the their fellow officers, the norm in todays police profession, is for peace officers to falsely arrest their “victims”, and to author false police reports to procure the bogus criminal prosecutions (i.e. to literally “frame” others) of those civilians whose Constitutional rights and basic human dignity have been violated; to justify what they did, and to act in conformity with that justification. The excessive force victims get criminally prosecuted, for crimes that they didn’t commit; usually for crimes such as “Resisting / obstructing / delaying a peace officer in the lawful performance of their duties (Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1)), assault on a peace officer (Cal. Penal Code § 240 / 241), “battery on a peace officer (Cal. Penal Code § 242 / 243(b); which is almost always, in reality, battery by a peace officer; otherwise known as “Excessive Force” or “Unreasonable Force”),and resisting officer with actual or threat of violence (Cal. Penal Code § 69.) Section 69 is a “wobbler” under California law; a crime that the government can charge as either a misdemeanor or a felony. This charge is usually reserved for cases in which the police use substantial force on the innocent arrestee (the real “victim”), and need to falsely claim more violent / serious conduct by the “victim” to justify their outrages.

So, for example, the crime of “battery on a peace officer” (Cal. Penal Code § 242 / 243(b)), is almost always, in reality, “battery by a peace officer”; otherwise known as “Excessive Force”; an “unreasonable seizure” of a person under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (See, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).)

If you have been the victim of Excessive Force by a police officer, please check our Section, above, entitled: “What To Do If You Have Been Beaten-Up Or False Arrested By The Police“. Also, please click on “Home“, above, or the other pages shown, for the information or assistance that we can provide for you. If you need to speak with a lawyer about your particular legal situation, please call the Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering for a free telephone consultation.

Thank you, and best of luck, whatever your needs.

Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering

Jerry L. Steering, Esq.

Palm Springs Police Brutality Attorney

Jerry L. Steering arguing before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in police shooting case, Pasadena, California

Jerry L. Steering, Esq., is a Police Misconduct Attorney, serving, among other places, Orange County, and the Orange County cities shown below, as well as Los Angeles County, San Diego County, Riverside County and San Bernardino County. Mr. Steering recently successfully prosecuted an excessive force / false arrest case in the Palm Springs area; Edward Moore, Jr. v. City of Desert Hot Springs; Indio – Riverside Superior Court ($825,000.00 settlement a end of plaintiff’s case for excessive force / false arrest.) The Palm Springs area is rife with police brutality, such as beatings, torturings and false arrests and prosecutions.

Across the Freeway, in Desert Hot Springs, the stories get worse. The Desert Hot Springs Police Department is probably the worst police department in modern United States history. In the mid-2000′s, “the inmates were running the asylum”. The Desert Hot Springs Police Department was divided into two factions; the “lettuce eaters” and the “meat eaters”. The meat eaters were those police officers who wouldn use any excuse to beat people up, and did so; even if just for fun. The lettuce eaters were those police officers who would only use force when reasonably necessary. See, FBI 302 Reports of interviews of DHSPD Sgt. Ron Hull and Sgt. Eddie Cole.

EXCESSIVE FORCE, FALSE ARREST AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CASES

Mr. Steering has been suing police officers, and defending bogus criminal cases of crimes against police officers, for over 28 years. The majority of our firms law practice, is suing police officers and other government officials, for claims such as false arrest, police brutality / excessive force, malicious prosecution, and other Constitutional Torts, and defending bogus criminal cases against the victims of such abuse by the police.

WHAT IS POLICE BRUTALITY / EXCESSIVE FORCE?

Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy, author of the Majority Opinions in Saucier v. Katz and Graham v. Connor

The United States Supreme Court has defined Excessive Force as follows:

Where, as here, the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures of the person . . . . . . . Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Id., at 8, 105 S.Ct., at 1699, quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 22-27, 88 S.Ct., at 1880-1883. Because the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mecha ical application, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), however, its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S., at 8-9, 105 S.Ct., at 1699-1700 (the question is whether the totality of the circumstances justifies a particular sort of . . . seizure). (See, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989.)

The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. See Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S., at 20-22, 88 S.Ct., at 1879-1881. The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause, even though the wrong person is arrested, Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971), nor by the mistaken execution of a valid search warrant on the wrong premises, Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987). With respect to a claim of excessive force, the same standard of reasonableness at the moment applies: Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judges chambers, Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d, at 1033, violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgmentsin circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolvingabout the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.

As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, however, the reasonableness inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-139, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723-1724, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978); see also Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S., at 21, 88 S.Ct., at 1879 (in analyzing the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure, it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard). An officers evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officers good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional. See, Scott v. United States, supra, 436 U.S., at 138, 98 S.Ct., at 1723, citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973).

In Graham, we held that claims of excessive force in the context of arrests or investigatory stops should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendments objective reasonableness standard, not under substantive due process principles. 490 U.S., at 388, 394. Because police officers are often forced to make split-second judgmentsin circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolvingabout the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation, id., at 397, the reasonableness of the officers belief as to the appropriate level of force should be judged from that on-scene perspective. Id., at 396. We set out a test that cautioned against the 20/20 vision of hindsight in favor of deference to the judgment of reasonable officers on the scene. Id., at 393, 396. Graham sets forth a list of factors relevant to the merits of the constitutional excessive force claim, requir[ing] careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id., at 396. If an officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely to fight back, for instance, the officer would be justified in using more force than in fact was needed. (See, Saucie v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).)

THE PROBLEM WITH GRAHAMS REASONABLE OFFICER STANDARD IN THE REAL WORLD – THE WATCHMAN GETS TO MAKE HIS OWN RULES THAT REGULATE HIS OWN CONDUCT

The problem with the description of how “excessive force” is defined, is not the Supreme Courts strong emphasis on the officers conduct being based on an objective standard; the hypothetical reasonable officer in the abstract. The problem is, that the standards in the police profession for what is reasonable or otherwise proper police conduct in a given situation, are generally neither the creature of legislation (i.e. state law requiring the audio recording of custodial police interrogations) nor the product of any judicially created mandate, duty, or prohibition (i.e. Constitutional limits on police conduct, such as the juidicially created exclusionary rule.) The conduct of the objectively reasonable officer; that standard that the Supreme Court attempted to describe in Graham v. OConnor and Saucier v. Katz, is created by the very persons whose conduct the Fourth Amendment is supposed to impose limits on. Thus, in a very real sense, the Supreme Court has set the standard (objectively reasonable officer) that the Fourth Amendment requires, but has delegated the details of whats reasonable or not, to the police.

Its letting the regulated enact their own regulations. If they want to all use tasers on civilians for not immediately complying with their orders (lawful or not), then thats reasonable, if they do so. If they all want to pepper-spray persons because their hands are in their pockets (and, therefore, they might possibly pose a threat), then thats reasonable. If they want to prone-out everyone at gun point that they detain, then thats reasonable. At the end of the day, in the real world police world, if the technique, method, procedure, policy or practice, reduces the danger level to the officer, you can bet that, eventually, they will find a way to justify such a technique, method, procedure, policy or practice, and make such otherwise unreasonable behavior, reasonable, for no othe reason than the police would prefer to act that way; Consitutional or not. You see the problem. The police have an old slogan: Its better to be judged by 12, then carried by 6. Its another way of saying, Ill act in a way that is in my self interest; not yours, and if I happen to trampel your Constitutional rights, so be it.

This is quite problematic, as the Bill of Rights was created for the Courts to protect us from the police / government, so when the police define “what’s reasonable force”, in a very real way, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, one of those rights in the Bill of Rights, is defined by the police, rather than the Courts. There are cases where the Courts will step-in and ban a particular police practice, but those cases are far and few between.

THE PROBLEM OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, COMPOUNDS THE PROBLEM CREATED BY GRAHAM

In a nutshell, the Qualified Immunity is an immunity from a lawsuit for violation of a civilians Constitutional rights, when those rights were actually violated, but a reasonably well trained police officer could have believed that his conduct did not constitute such Constitutional violation. So, even if the police officer actually violated your Constitutional Rights, he may be immune from suit, because the law was not clearly established enough at the time of the violation, to hold a police officer liable for his conduct. This is a doctrine contrived by the conservative members of the Supreme Court (since 1982 in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)), to ensure that you cant do anything about (or at least do a whole lot less about) your Constitutional Rights being trampled by the government.

So, for example, if the police come-up with a whole new technique to restrain people, such as a with a taser, or pepper-spray, or pepper-balls, or water-balls, or hobbling (police hog tying), or a shock-belting, or stun-gunning, the officer may very well be entitled to qualified immunity from being sued for the misuse of any of the above-mentioned devices; not because its reasonable, but because the police just use those devices in such manners; thereby giving the Courts an excuse to relieve the police officer from liability for the damage caused by his violation of the Constitutional Rights of civilians:

Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)) . . . Accordingly, we must resolve immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation. Pearson, 129, S.Ct. at 815.

An officer will be denied qualified immunity in a 1983 action only if (1) the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury, show that the officers conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the incident such that a reasonable officer would have understood her conduct to be unlawful in that situation. Saucier, 533 at 201-02; Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011.) To assist the development of constitutional precedent, we exercise our sound discretion to follow Sauciers conventional two-step procedure and address first whether the Torres Family has alleged the violation of a constitutional right. See, Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 818.

The qualified immunity analysis involves two separate steps. First, the court determines whether the facts show the officers conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001.) If the alleged violate a constitutional right, then the defendants are entitled to immunity and the claim must be dismissed. However, if the alleged conduct did violate such a right, then the court must determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged unlawful action. Id.

A right is clearly established if a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Id., at 202. If the right is not clearly established, then the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. While the order in which these questions are addressed is left to the courts sound discretion, it is often beneficial to perform the analysis in the sequence outlined above. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818 (2009.) Of course, where a claim of qualified immunity is to be denied, both questions must be answered.

When determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact at the summary judgment stage, the court must take all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. In the context of qualified immunity, determinations that turn on questions of law, such as whether the officers had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to support their actions, are appropriately decided by the court. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993.)

However, a trial court should not grant summary judgment when there is a genuine dispute as to the facts and circumstances within an officers knowledge or what the officer and claimant did or failed to do. Id. (Saucier v. Katz, supra.)

WHY THE POLICE CRIMINALLY PROSECUTE THEIR VICTIMS.

Unfortunately, because of institutional pressures (i.e. ratting out fellow officer not a good career move), and the obvious political and practical consequences of not backing-up the their fellow officers, the norm in todays police profession, is for peace officers to falsely arrest their victims, and to author false police reports to procure the bogus criminal prosecutions (i.e. to literally frame others) of those civilians whose Constitutional rights and basic human dignity have been violated; to justify what they did, and to act in conformity with that justification. The excessive force victims get criminally prosecuted, for crimes that they didnt commit; usually for crimes such as Resisting / obstructing / delaying a peace officer in the lawful performance of their duties (Cal. Penal Code 148(a)(1)), assault on a peace officer (Cal. Penal Code 240 / 241), battery on a peace officer (Cal. Penal Code 242 / 243(b) (which is almost always, in reality, battery by a peace officer; otherwise known as Excessive Force or Unreasonable Force), and resisting officer with actual or threat of violence (Cal. Penal Code 69.) Section 69 is a wobbler under California law; a crime that the government can charge as either a misdemeanor or a felony. This charge is usually reserved for cases in which the police use substantial force on the innocent arrestee (the real victim), and need to falsely claim more violent / serious conduct by the victim to justify their outrages.

So, for example, the crime of battery on a peace officer (Cal. Penal Code 242 / 243(b)), is almost always, in reality, battery by a peace officer; otherwise known as Excessive Force; an unreasonable seizure of a person under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (See, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).)

FRAME-UPS AND THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

If the falsely arrested victim, now a criminal defendant being framed, gets convicted of any crime, he/she can no longer sue for a false arrest, even though the police may not have had either a warrant or probable cause to have arrested the victim. See, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994.) Moreover, if the criminal defendant gets convicted of a crime that requires the victim officer to be engaged in the lawful performance of his/her duties, most of the time, the excessive force victim is legally precluded (via the doctrine of colleteral estoppel) from suing the police for excessive force. See, Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 94 Cal.App.4th 1401 (2002.)

If you have been the victim of Excessive Force by a police officer, please check our Section, above, entitled: What To Do If You Have Been Beaten-Up Or False Arrested By The Police. Also, please click on Home, above, or the other pages shown, for the information or assistance that we can provide for you. If you need to speak with a lawyer about your particular legal situation, please call the Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering for a free telephone consultation.

Thank you, and best of luck, whatever your needs.

Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering

Jerry L. Steering, Esq.

Criminal Towing Industry Cases

Jerry L. Steering has been practicing criminal law since 1984 (in California since 1986.) He has tried and otherwise litigated hundreds of criminal cases, including murder cases, manslaughter cases, assault and battery cases, drug possession and drug manufacturing cases, DUI cases, Vehicular homicide cases, white-collar investor fraud cases, sex-offender or drug offender registration cases, violation of court order cases, domestic violence cases, theft and embezzlement cases, towing industry cases, and the general spectrum of criminal violations. Mr. Steering’s law practice involves representing persons in California. He is also a member of the State Bar of Georgia and has also litigated cases in Georgia, Alabama and the District of Columbia. He is an expert in police brutality / excessive force and false arrest cases, and has been litigating these cases since 1984.The great majority of Mr. Steering’s law practice is devoted to defending bogus criminal cases against the victims of abuse by the police, and suing police officers and other government officials, for claims such as false arrest, police brutality / excessive force, malicious prosecution, and other “Constitutional Torts.”

Jerry L. Steering has been practicing criminal law since 1984 (in California since 1986.) He has tried and otherwise litigated hundreds of criminal cases, including murder cases, manslaughter cases, assault and battery cases, drug possession and drug manufacturing cases, DUI cases, Vehicular homicide cases, white-collar investor fraud cases, sex-offender or drug offender registration cases, violation of court order cases, domestic violence cases, theft and embezzlement cases, towing industry cases, and the general spectrum of criminal violations.

Mr. Steering is an expert in defending your bogus criminal action, in a way to best protect and enhance your ability to ultimately obtain some justice; reasonable compensation and redress, for your police beating; for your false arrest; for your unlawful search and seizure; for your malicious criminal prosecution; and for what’s usually at the center of all of the above, the exercise of our right to freedom of speech, and to complain to public officers, about misconduct by them or others, under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

PUBLICATIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW.

Mr. Steering is also a published legal scholar, and has a published Law Review Article a logical quandary of federal evidentiary law: the disparity in the use of “accomplice accusations” between Fourth Amendment (accomplice accusations sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause for search warrant), and Sixth Amendment analysis (accomplice accusations are so inherently unreliable, that Congress could not have meant to have included them with the ambit of the Declaration Against Penal Interest exception to the hearsay rule.) As explained in the Law Review Article, a statement is either made under circumstances that we believe indicate that they are reliable, or not. Although the tests may be somewhat different, the statement is either reliable or not, and treating the statement as unreliable for Sixth Amendment purposes, but as reliable for Fourth Amendment purposes, is simply illogical. See, “The Application Of Sixth Amendment Tests For The Reliability Of Hearsay Evidence To Probable Cause Determinations”, 16 Rutgers Law Journal 869 (1985.)

CRIMINAL TOWING INDUSTRY CASES.

Don’t Get Convicted For Auto Theft Or Extortion For A Misdemeanor Or Infraction Violation of Vehicle Code Sections 22658 or 22953

Jerry L. Steering has substantial civil and criminal experience in the area of Private Property Impound cases. He has defend major felony prosecutions of tow truck companies and their drivers in Los Angeles County, Orange County and San Bernardino County. Many of these cases, that should at most have been a civil matter, have been converted into felonious conduct, by politically ambitious public prosecutors, following a series of incidents in the mid-2000′s, regarding “predatory towing.” Rather than the motorist having a mere civil dispute with the towing company, as prescribed by the Vehicle Code Sections 22658 and 22953, or infractions or even Vehicle Code misdemeanors, prosecutors are criminally prosecuting towing companies, and charging then with auto theft (Cal. Penal Code § 487(d)(1)), taking a vehicle without consent (Cal. Veh Code §  10851) and extortion (Cal. Penal Code §§  518 and 519.) Their legal theory is basically that Section 22658 specifies the situations in which a towing company can legally tow a vehicle from private property without the consent of the owner / motorist, and that any violation of those Vehicle Code misdemeanors or infractions, also constitutes the unlawful taking of a vehicle without the owner’s consent; violation of Cal. Veh Code §  10851.

The DA’s also prosecute the same towing company and its drivers for extortion, Cal. Penal Code §§  518 and 519, for demanding a towing fee and other associated charges, in order to release their vehicle to them; even for “drop fees.” In the minds of these politically ambitious prosecutors, your prosecution if their ticket to becoming a Judge, and they don’t care how many innocent lives they ruin to do it.

MR. STEERING HAS EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE IN THE DEFENSE OF THESE TYPE OF CRIMINAL CHARGES, AGAINST TOWING COMPANIES AND ITS DRIVERS.

Predatory Towing Is, In Large Part, A Fiction.

When it comes right down to it, a non-consensual towing of a vehicle is either lawful or it’s not. If it’s lawful, than it can’t be predatory; or can it? The politicians scramble to demonize tow truck operators, who lawfully tow vehicles, because everyone hates have their car towed, and because they need a cause to trumpet in times of no other demons available for protecting against (when’s the last time that you heard Nancy Reagan’s “Just say no to drugs.”) If you park your car at your friend’s apartment complex in a fire lane zone, only to drop-off a package to your friend, and only intend to leave your car in that spot for three minutes. Should the towing company be able to grab and take-off with your car if they are lying in wait for someone to park in the fire lane? Is that really predatory towing? The politicians claim “Yes”, but there has been no laws broken.

So, What’s All The Hubbub About “Predatory Towing.”

Here’s the problem. Between 2000 and 2005, the issue of whether a California peace officer either could enforce the provisions of Cal. Veh Code § 22658(l), specifically that provision requiring that in the case of a nonconsensual towing of a vehicle by one in possession of private property, that the property owner or his agent be present at the scene of the tow, and personally authorize any such tow, in writing, at the scene, was in dispute. If the towing company was in federal court, they win, if they’re in state court, they lose. What? How can that be? How can a towing company successfully sue the police for arresting him for actions that the same towing company often got sued for, and criminally prosecuted for, in state court?

What  Is A Private Property Impound?

Private Property Impound  is the nonconsensual towing of a parked vehicle from private property. It is usually initiated by either a security guard, property manager or property owner, calling a towing company, because someone parked their vehicle on private property, like an apartment complex, in violation of the California Vehicle Code. In order for one to have another’s car towed from private property, all entrances to  the property must conspicuously display signage in the Vehicle Code’s required statutory language, and conforms to its physical signage requirements:

Cal. Vehicle Code Section 22658 provides in pertinent part:

“The owner or person in lawful possession of private property, including an association of a common interest development as defined in Sections 4080 and 4100 of the Civil Code, may cause the removal of a vehicle parked on the property to a storage facility that meets the requirements of subdivision (n) under any of the following circumstances:

(1) There is displayed, in plain view at all entrances to the property, a sign not less than 17 inches by 22 inches in size, with lettering not less than one inch in height, prohibiting public parking and indicating that vehicles will be removed at the owner’s expense, and containing the telephone number of the local traffic law enforcement agency and the name and telephone number of each towing company that is a party to a written general towing authorization agreement with the owner or person in lawful possession of the property. The sign may also indicate that a citation may also be issued for the violation. . . . .

Cal. Vehicle Code § 22658 also provides under what circumstances, a towing company may remove a properly signed parking area

. . . . l) (1) (A) A towing company shall not remove or commence the removal of a vehicle from private property without first obtaining the written authorization from the property owner or lessee . . . .

. . . . (B) The written authorization under subparagraph (A) shall include all of the following:

(i) The make, model, vehicle identification number, and license plate number of the removed vehicle.

(ii) The name, signature, job title, residential or business address and working telephone number of the person, described in subparagraph (A), authorizing the removal of the vehicle.

(iii) The grounds for the removal of the vehicle.

(iv) The time when the vehicle was first observed parked at the private property.

(v) The time that authorization to tow the vehicle was given . . . .

. . . . . (D) A towing company shall not remove or commence the removal of a vehicle from private property described in subdivision (a) of Section 22953 unless the towing company has made a good faith inquiry to determine that the owner or the property owner’s agent complied with Section 22953.

(E) (i) General authorization to remove or commence removal of a vehicle at the towing company’s discretion shall not be delegated to a towing company or its affiliates except in the case of a vehicle unlawfully parked within 15 feet of a fire hydrant or in a fire lane, or in a manner which interferes with an entrance to, or exit from, the private property.

(ii) In those cases in which general authorization is granted to a towing company or its affiliate to undertake the removal or commence the removal of a vehicle that is unlawfully parked within 15 feet of a fire hydrant or in a fire lane, or that interferes with an entrance to, or exit from, private property, the towing company and the property owner, or owner’s agent, or person in lawful possession of the private property shall have a written agreement granting that general authorization.

(2) If a towing company removes a vehicle under a general authorization described in subparagraph (E) of paragraph (1) and that vehicle is unlawfully parked within 15 feet of a fire hydrant or in a fire lane, or in a manner that interferes with an entrance to, or exit from, the private property, the towing company shall take, prior to the removal of that vehicle, a photograph of the vehicle that clearly indicates that parking violation. Prior to accepting payment, the towing company shall keep one copy of the photograph taken pursuant to this paragraph, and shall present that photograph and provide, without charge, a photocopy to the owner or an agent of the owner, when that person claims the vehicle. . . .

. . . . (4) A person who violates this subdivision is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than three months, or by both that fine and imprisonment.

(5) A person who violates this subdivision is civilly liable to the owner of the vehicle or his or her agent for four times the amount of the towing and storage charges. . . .. . . . (n) A vehicle removed from private

property pursuant to this section shall be stored in a facility that meets all of the following requirements:

(1) (A) Is located within a 10-mile radius of the property from where the vehicle was removed. . . .

. . . . (2) (A) Remains open during normal business hours and releases vehicles after normal business hours.

(B) A gate fee may be charged for releasing a vehicle after normal business hours, weekends, and state holidays. However, the maximum hourly charge for releasing a vehicle after normal business hours shall be one-half of the hourly tow rate charged for initially towing the vehicle, or less.

(C) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and for purposes of this paragraph, “normal business hours” are Monday to Friday, inclusive, from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., inclusive, except state holidays.

(3) Has a public pay telephone in the office area that is open and accessible to the public.

So, What’s The Problem With Federal Preemption Of Cal. Vehicle Code § 22658? The Creation Of The Patrol Towing Industry.

In 1996, the owner of a towing company in Santa Ana, California, Patrick Tocher, was wrongfully put out of business, when the City of Santa Ana revoked his City of Santa Ana towing permit . Rather than lay down and take it, Mr. Tocher filed a “Pro Se” lawsuit against the City of Santa Ana; claiming, among other things, that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (49 U.S.C. § 14501) preempted state and local laws on almost all towing issues; especially those dealing with the primary issue for what was to become that patrol towing industry; whether the property owner / manager can authorize a towing company to patrol their parking lots, and tow away vehicles that are either in violation of state or local laws, or otherwise in violation of the rules of that entity.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California (Judge Alicemarie Stotler) issued a permanent injunction, enjoining the City of Santa Ana, California, from enforcing not only its own Municipal Towing Ordinances, but also much of Cal. Veh. Code § 22658; that Vehicle Code Section that deals with private property impounds; the non-consensual towing of a vehicle from private property, because she found that those provisions of Section 22658(l) (and most others involving private property impounds), were not safety regulations.

Senior U.S. District Judge Alicemarie Huber Stotler (May 29, 1942 – June 9, 2014))

In affirming the permanent injunction that had issued from Judge Alicemarie Stotler, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held not only that the City of Santa Ana, California, was preempted by federal law, from regulating the towing of vehicles (i.e. requiring city towing permits, requiring that tow companies that do towing business in Santa Ana, maintain a tow yard in Santa Ana), but was also preempted from enforcement of those provisions requiring the presence and written consent of the owner or lessee of the private property (or their agent) for each tow. See, Tocher v. City of Santa Ana, 219 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2000.) See also, “Tow Truck Operator Wins Suit”, L.A. Times, July 16, 2000.

Because the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals enjoined the City of Sana Ana from enforcing the provision of Section 22658(l) requiring the presence and written consent of the owner or lessee of the private property (or their agent) for each tow, towing companies made a fortune by patrol towing. Here’s the routine? Towing companies would obtain General Authorizations from apartment complex or shopping center owners / managers to patrol their parking lots for parking violations, and when they found such violations, tow the violating vehicles. The towing companies would, for free, erect the proper signage for the property, and would get a list of apartment tenants. The towing companies would have parking permits printed-up and would give them to the property managers, to distribute their tenants. The tenants were told that they needed to have the parking permit conspicuously displayed on the tenants’ vehicles. Then, when the towing company would patrol the apartment complexes parking lots and find cars parked there without the required permit, or parked in a fire lane, a handicap zone or blocking traffic, they would tow the vehicle away as soon as possible.

Because many, if not most of the apartments that would have their lots patrolled were the type of apartments that had more persons residing there with vehicles than there were permits issued for a particular apartment (i.e. two parking permits issued per apartment, but four people with vehicle residing in such apartments), there would always be a treasure trove of vehicles to tow, and the towing companies didn’t disappoint. When the tow trucks came by at 3:00 a.m., there were always plenty of vehicles parked there that didn’t have permits, or were otherwise in violation of parking laws and rules (i.e. parking in fire lane, parked blocked traffic or parking in a handicap spot without a handicap sticker, all still prohibited by state law.) Towing cars from these lots was like fishing in a fish hatchery, filled with underfed hungry fish. The towing companies made a killing.

The apartment managers and many of the tenants, were also very happy about the whole arrangement, because many legitimate tenants who paid to live there, and who had a properly issued parking permits, wouldn’t have their own parking space to park in, and often had to park down the street from their paid for designated parking spot. Moreover, the apartment managers liked the arrangement, because it would cut down on drug dealing in their buildings, because drug purchasers would park their car in the lot, and go to the drug dealers apartment to buy their drugs. However, since they didn’t have a parking permit for that apartment complex, by the time that they returned to their unlawfully parked vehicles, they would find that their cars had been towed away. That certainly cut-down on the drug dealers dealing out of their apartment in such an apartment complex.

Moreover, commercial lots, may of which didn’t have enough parking for their merchant tenant’s patrons, also had their lots patrolled, and generally liked that arrangement. Okay, so now what’s the problem?

The Witch Hunt Against Tow Companies For Patrol Towing Results In State And Federal Legislation, And A United States Supreme Court Decision, On State And Local Control Of The Towing Industry.

The State Courts Claim Not To Be Bound By The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

In 2001 in People ex rel. v Servantes, 86 Cal.App.4th 1081, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 (2001), the First District Court of Appeal refused to follow Tocher,  and held that Vehicle Code Section 22658(l)(1)(A) wasn’t preempted by the FAAA Act of 1994, and that in the case of a non-consensual tow of a vehicle from private property, other than in the case of an unlawfully parked vehicle that was either blocking traffic or parked in a fire lane, that a towing company needed to get specific written authorization from the private property owner or his/her agent for each tow, who also had to be present on the property at the time of the tow.

Accordingly, California state and local police agencies found themselves in a quagmire: under California law (Servantes), a towing company could be cited for misdemeanor violation of Vehicle Code Section 22658(l)(1)(A) for patrol towing, but if they did, the towing company could go to federal court, and (pursuant to Tocher) sue the police officers and their employing entity for injunctive relief and for damages, for enforcing Section 22658(l)(1)(A). Most, if not all police agencies responded by refusing to follow Servantes, but considerable resentment built-up over the years by police agencies and prosecutorial authorities against towing companies involved in patrol towing.

In response to this “political resentment” of the patrol towing industry, in 2005, in Tillison v. City of San Diego, 406 F.3d 1126 (9th. Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit partially backtracked on Tocher in holding that Cal. Vehicle Code § 22658(l)(1) is not preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 14501, because requiring that in the case of a non-consensual tow of a vehicle from private property, that the property owner or his/her agent be present on the property where the private property impound takes place, and requiring that the property owner or his/her agent authorize in writing each and every tow from the property (save the non-consensual towing of a car that is parked in a fire-lane or is blocking the flow of traffic), can properly be characterized as a safety regulation, and, therefore, exempted from federal preemption.

Then U.S. Representative Christopher Cox (R-Cal) was the co-sponsor of HR-3; a Bill to Amendment 49 U.S.C. Section 14501 to cease federal preemption of state towing laws

Moreover, in 2005, Congress enacted HR-3, that amended 49 U.S.C. § 14501, by adding 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c), that states:

“(5) Limitation on statutory construction.— Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a State from requiring that, in the case of a motor vehicle to be towed from private property without the consent of the owner or operator of the vehicle, the person towing the vehicle have prior written authorization from the property owner or lessee (or an employee or agent thereof) or that such owner or lessee (or an employee or agent thereof) be present at the time the vehicle is towed from the property, or both.”

Accordingly, while Cal. Veh. Code § 22658(l)(1) is now not preempted by Section 14501, other provisions of Cal. Veh. Code § 22658 still are so under federal law; something that the California First District Court of Appeal refused to recognize in People ex rel. v Servantes, 86 Cal.App.4th 1081, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 (2001.)

Even with this change in law, if the towing company has a General Authorization to patrol the lot, and, the towing company finds a vehicle that is either: 1) parked in a way that’s blocking traffic, 2) parked in a fire lane, or 3) parked in a handicap space. Other than those exceptions, if a towing company wants to remove a vehicle from private property, such as a shopping center or an apartment complex, the owner of the property or their agent, must be present at the scene of the tow, and give their written authorization for the tow; actually requesting that the vehicle be towed.

In the commercial parking lot setting, Cal. Veh. Code § 22953 provides that when the requirements of signage and notice have been met for a commercial premises private parking lot (i.e. office buildings, shopping centers), that a vehicle still cannot be towed away from that private parking lot until the vehicle has been parked there for at least one hour. This one hour requirement is found in Cal. Veh. Code § 22953, that provides:

“Removal Prohibited

22953.  (a) An owner or person in lawful possession of private property that is held open to the public, or a discernible portion thereof, for parking of vehicles at no fee, or an employee or agent thereof, shall not tow or remove, or cause the towing or removal, of a vehicle within one hour of the vehicle being parked.

(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), a vehicle may be removed immediately after being illegally parked within 15 feet of a fire hydrant, in a fire lane, in a manner that interferes with an entrance to, or an exit from, the private property, or in a parking space or stall legally designated for disabled persons.(c) Subdivision (a) does not apply to property designated for parking at residential property, or to property designated for parking at a hotel or motel where the parking stalls or spaces are clearly marked for a specific room.(d) It is the intent of the Legislature in the adoption of subdivision (a) to avoid causing the unnecessary stranding of motorists and placing them in dangerous situations, when traffic citations and other civil remedies are available, thereby promoting the safety of the general public.(e) A person who violates subdivision (a) is civilly liable to the owner of the vehicle or his or her agent for two times the amount of the towing and storage charges.

Amended Sec. 5, Ch. 609, Stats. 2006. Effective January 1, 2007.”

The Witch Hunt Against Tow Companies For Patrol Towing; Felony Prosecutions Against Towing Companies For Infraction / Misdemeanor Vehicle Code Towing Laws.

Since 2005, police and prosecutorial agencies have been engaged in “payback” for the five years (2000 to 2005) that the police watched towing companies engage in patrol towing (that still exists in the above-shown more restricted form; patrol towing of vehicles from private property that are either blocking traffic, or are parked in fire lanes). The “payback” was and is, prosecutions such as the case at bar; felony prosecutions for “auto theft”, extortion, attempted extortion and car jacking, for actions that the vehicle code specifically classify as misdemeanors.

This “political payback” also included various additions and amendment to the Vehicle Code. Until 2007, violations of the various provisions of  the California Vehicle Code relating to the towing of  vehicles were infractions[1]. That changed in 2007 when[2] the California legislature enacted AB 2210. In doing so, the legislature sought to increase penalties from infractions to misdemeanors for certain violations of the Vehicle Code regarding the non-consensual towing of vehicles from private property.

The cops and DA’s haven’t forgot 2000 through 2005. They are vigorously prosecuting towing companies and their drivers for felony auto theft and extortion, for even the most technical violations (i.e. no public payphone at tow yard; car towed more than 1o miles away, etc.).

If you’re being prosecuted for auto theft or extortion for vehicle towing, the Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering can help you.

Jerry L. Steering

Santa Ana, CA Police Brutality Attorney

As far back as 1990, Mr. Steering won a $612,000.00 jury verdict (plus attorney’s fees) against a sole Santa Ana Police Department police officer for unreasonable force; Farahani v. City of Santa Ana, U.S. District Court (Santa Ana)(See, “Police Brutality False Arrest Case Results” pages for verdicts / settlements / judgments against other police agencies.)
Mr. Steering has been suing police officers and defending bogus criminal cases of crimes against police officers, since 1984, and in California since 1986. Mr. Steering is a member of the State Bar of Georgia, and had also litigated cases in Georgia, Alabama and the District of Columbia. He is an expert in police brutality / excessive force and false arrest cases, and has been litigating these cases since 1984.The great majority of Mr. Steering’s law practice is defending bogus criminal cases against the victims of abuse by the police, and suing police officers and other government officials, for claims such as false arrest, police brutality / excessive force, malicious prosecution, and other “Constitutional Torts.”
Santa-Ana-Police-Department-MET-Team-Gansters-at-Pool-300Santa Ana Police Department police officers are well versed in false arresting and maliciously prosecuting innocents for such “resistance offenses”, for Contempt of Cop. They routinely at least attempt to procure the filing of some sort of “resistance offense” for your daring to question or protest their authority of actions (“Contempt of Cop“), for at least a misdemeanor Count of violation of Cal. Penal Code §148(a)(1), resisting / obstructing / delaying a peace officer engaged in the lawful performance of his/her duties, or these days, if they really beat you up badly, for violation of Cal. Penal Code § 69; felony resisting officer with threat of, or use of force and violence.
If you have been the victim of Excessive Force by a police officer, please check our Section, above, entitled: “What To Do If You Have Been Beaten-Up Or False Arrested By The Police“. Also, please click on “Home“, above, or the other pages shown, for the information or assistance that we can provide for you. If you need to speak with a lawyer about your particular legal situation, please call the Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering for a free telephone consultation.Thank you, and best of luck, whatever your needs.

Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering

Jerry L. Steering, Esq.

Free Case Evaluation

42 U.S.C. § 1983 Lawsuits

Jerry L. Steering is a civil rights lawyer who sues police officers and other public officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, literally, almost every day. He is an expert in these “Section 1983 cases”, and can help you obtain whatever vindication of your federal Constitutional rights is available to you, based on the facts of your particular case. Almost every one of Mr. Steering’s civil rights cases involves allegations that some peace officer or other person acting under the color of state law, violated his client’s federal and state constitutional rights.

The federal statute that persons in the United States use every day to sue police officers and other persons acting under the color of state law, is “The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871“;  42 U.S.C. § 1983. As shown below, Section 1983 was a Reconstruction Era Law enacted by Congress along with other laws, to enforce the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment and its guarantee that the protections of the federal constitution apply to persons of African descent, as well as white person.

The Civil War and The Abolition Of Slavery:

The Reconstruction Amendments To The United States Constitution; Amendments 13, 14 And 15.

 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is A Post-Civil War Statute, That Was Enacted To Give Persons Of African Descent A Right To Sue For Damages In Federal Court For State Action That Violates Their Federal Constitutional Rights.

The federal statute that persons in the United States use every day to sue police officers and other persons acting under the color of state law, is “The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871″; 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As shown below, Section 1983 was a Reconstruction Law enacted by Congress, to enforce the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment and its guarantee that the protections of the federal constitution apply to persons of African descent, as well as white persons. Our present “Federal Civil Rights Law” (42 U.S.C. § 1983) entitles anyone within the United States to sue in federal court for  violation of the rights guaranteed to them under the laws and Constitution of the United States, by state and local officials, acting under the color of state law. Section 1983 is that “appropriate legislation” referred to in the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments; the Reconstruction amendments, that abolished slavery, and guaranteed that persons of African descent were, in fact, citizens, and for Congress to provide a federal civil remedy for the violation of any persons constitutional rights, by one acting under the color of state law. Today we use this statute to sue the police for anything from a false arrest, to a wrongful use of force by the police, to a malicious criminal prosecution, to free speech retaliation cases.

Ratification Of The Thirteenth Amendment To The United States Constitution.

In 1865 the states ratified the Thirteenth Amendment, that abolished slavery.

The Thirteenth Amendment provides:

Amendment XIII

Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime      whereof   the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist in the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Ratification Of The Fourteenth Amendment To The United States Constitution.

In 1868, the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, to mandate that recently freed slaves and other persons of African descent were citizens, with the same privileges and immunities as other citizens; including due process of the law; a fundamentally fair process, before a state shall deprive any person life, liberty or property:

The Fourteenth Amendment provides:

Amendment XIII

“The All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

Ratification Of The Fifteenth  Amendment To The United States Constitution.

On March 30, 1870, the states ratified the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Amendment XV

Section 1.  The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

                    Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

The “Third Enforcement Act” To Enforce The Fourteenth Amendment; On April 20, 1871, Congress Passed The Ku Klux Klan Act;                         42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

April 20, 1971:

“An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes.”

42 U.S.C. § 1983:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory  decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”

In the years after the Civil War, the South began to see the emergence of white terrorist groups. These organizations of composed mostly of veterans still aspiring to the goals of the Confederacy and their own Southern heritage, brought terror to freed blacks who looked to participate in the community as well as to their white allies. The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 was Congress’ attempt to put an end to the policies of terrorism, intimidation, and violence that the Klan, the Knights of the White Camelia, and the Jayhawkers had been using. The law unfortunately failed to eradicate the Klan or abolish the continued use of fear tactics and brutality against blacks and supportive whites.

Founded as a fraternal organization by Confederate veterans in Pulaski, Tennessee, in 1866, the Ku Klux Klan soon became a paramilitary group devoted to the overthrow of Republican governments in the South and the reassertion of white supremacy. Through murder, kidnapping, and violent intimidation, Klansmen sought to secure Democratic victories in elections by attacking black voters and, less frequently, white Republican leaders.

In response to Klan violence, Congress passed the first of “three Enforcement Acts” on May 31, 1870, to ensure that the provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were followed. The act, which made it a federal offense to attempt to deprive anyone of his civil rights, had little effect on the deteriorating situation. A second Enforcement Act, passed on February 28, 1871, established federal supervision over elections, but also did little to remedy the situation. After the failure in the House of a more powerful bill that would have given the federal government additional power to enforce election law, President Grant decided to intervene. The President met with Congressional leaders to urge the passage of stronger legislation, and on their recommendation, Grant issued a direct appeal to Congress requesting a new law. Grant’s appeal was successful, and Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act

Also known as the “Third Enforcement Act”, the bill was a controversial expansion of federal authority, designed to give the federal government additional power to protect voters. The act established penalties in the form of fines and jail time for attempts to deprive citizens of equal protection under the laws and gave the President the authority to use federal troops and suspend the writ of habeas corpus in ensuring that civil rights were upheld.

President Grant put the new legislation to work after several Klan incidents in May. He sent additional troops to the South and suspended the writ of habeas corpus in nine counties in South Carolina. Aided by Attorney General Amos T. Akermen and the newly created Department of Justice, extensive work was done to prosecute the Klan. While relatively few convictions were obtained, the new legislation helped to suppress Klan activities and ensure a greater degree of fairness in the election of 1872.

In 1871, Congress enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983), that gives any person whose federal Constitutional rights have been violated, a right to sue, any person who violated those rights under the color of state law, in a United States District Court. Section 1983 lawsuits can also be brought in a state court of general jurisdiction; See, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, a person who is falsely arrested by a peace officer (i.e. police officer, deputy sheriff, or some other officer who derives peace officer powers from state law), may sue the police officer under Section 1983, as well as under California state law. Similarly, one who is subjected to unreasonable force, a malicious criminal prosecution, or other Constitution violation, may sue in a federal or state court for redress under Section 1983.

Commonly referred to as “Section 1983 cases” or actions, this federal statute was enacted by Congress in response to a letter from President Ulysses S. Grant; complaining of the conditions in the Southern states, and asking Congress to create a remedy for persons of African descent (i.e. former slaves), for violation of their federal Constitutional rights, by persons acting under the color of state law; the Sheriff and his posse. That’s what the KKK did. The local Sheriff and his posse, deputized and KKK members, would murder former slaves, but their widows and children had no actual remedy in Southern state courts; no remedy that either a Court would allow to proceed, or if so allowed, that a Southern white Post Civil War jury, would award compensation for. Accordingly, President Grant wanted persons of African descent to have a remedy in federal court, for such atrocities. Similar criminal statutes were enacted by Congress for the same Constitutional violations, in 18 U.S.C. § 241 in 1966 (conspiracy to violate Constitutional rights), and 18 U.S.C. § 242 in 1870 (violation of federal Constitutional rights under color of law.

That statute is the vehicle that is used today to sue police officers and other governmental officials. It’s literally the most used law in the United States to sue police officers for violating the federal Constitutional rights of another.

Section 1983 Actions – Our Remedy For Federal Constitutional Violations.

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive Constitutional rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred in the federal Constitution itself. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989.) In other words, Section 1983 is a federal statute that doesn’t define any Constitutional rights, but merely provides a civil remedy for persons whose federal Constitutional rights have been violated. So, when the policeman falsely arrests you, you can sue the cop under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of your federal Constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment, as being the victim of an unreasonable seizure of your person. So, when the policeman beats-you-up for telling him that you know your rights and he has no right to search your car, you can sue him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of your federal Constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment for an unreasonable seizure of your person under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and, for violation of your First Amendment right to free speech / right to petition government for redress of grievances, for retaliating against you for your right to protest police actions. Duran v. City of Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1990.)

If you believe that a government official, including police officers, violated your Constitutional rights, please contact us about your case.

Jerry L. Steering, Esq.

The Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering   •   4063 Birch Street   •   Suite 100   •   Newport Beach, CA 92660  map   •   © 1984-2016
Phone: (949) 474-1849   •   Fax: (949) 474-1883   •   Email: jerrysteering@yahoo.com   •   Web: www.SteeringLaw.com

Temecula Police Misconduct Attorney

Jerry L. Steering, Esq., is a Police Misconduct Attorney, who is a Specialist in Suing the Polce for Constitutional Violations such as False Arrest, the Use of Excessive Force, and Malicious Criminal Prosecutions. Mr. Steering has been suing the police since 1984. His law practice involves serving, among other places, the cities of Murietta and Temecula, the Riverside County cities shown below, and throughout the State of California.

The Riverside County Sheriff’s Department is especially creepy in the Southwest Judicial District, that includes Riverside cities from Lake Elsinore to Temecula, and the rest of South County.

The Internal Affairs Bureau of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department is also a Division of that agency, devoted to protecting the Department and its deputies for liability for torts and crimes perpetrated against civilians. You’re not going to find misconduct if you’re not looking for it, and the last things that the Internal Affairs Bureau of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department is interesting in finding, is justification (contrived or otherwise) for its officers’ actions.

Most recently, Mr. Steering has obtained settlements against the County of Riverside for wrongfully tasing and falsely arresting a former Riverside County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Sheriff (Daniel Torres v. County of Riverside, U.S. District Court, Central District of California (Riverside)(2010), $500,000.00), for using unreasonable force and falsely arresting a 64 year old man (Chynoweth v. County of Riverside et al., Riverside County Superior Court (2011), $750,000.00; a case of a false arrest and knee dropping at the Temecula Rod Run of 2011), and for using unreasonable force upon a bystander who witnessed the Sheriff’s Deputies beat-up an unconscious man who crashed his vehicle in front of the plaintiff’s home during a vehicle pursuit. See, Danny Eatherton v. County of Riverside.

Mr. Steering also obtained an $825,000.00 settlement at completion of trial from the Riverside County City of Desert Hot Springs, for unreasonable force and false arrest [Moore, et al. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, Riverside County Superior Court (2012) (Sgt. Anthony Sclafani, now a guest of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, was the main defendant.)

POLICE MISCONDUCT ATTORNEY; POLICE BRUTALITY CASES.

Jerry L. Steering has successfully sued the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department over the years.

Riverside County Sheriff Chad Bianco and Riverside County District Attorney Mike Hestrin exchange pleasantries

They routinely violate the constitutional rights of the locals and visitors alike, and usually get the “prosecutorial support” of an equally creepy District Attorney’s Office, that is more than happy to “persecute” those violated by the Sheriff’s Department; not because they believe that the civilian committed a crime, but only to protect the reputation, and potential civil liability of the Deputy Sheriffs committing the Constitutional violations.

In Riverside County, the District Attorney’s Office routinely prosecutes the victims of Police Brutality and False Arrest, to protect the Sheriff’s Department from its victims. This is no joke. Moreover, the Judges in the Murrieta Courthouse where Temecula cases are heard, bend over backwards to help the District Attorney’s Office convict the innocent victims of police violence.

Most recently, Mr. Steering has obtained settlements against the County of Riverside for wrongfully tasing a former Riverside County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Sheriff [Torres v. County of Riverside, U.S. District Court, Central District of California (Riverside)(2010), $500,000.00], and for using unreasonable force and falsely arresting a 64 year old man [Chynoweth v. County of Riverside et al., Riverside County Superior Court (2011), $750,000.00.] 

AMR AmbulanceIn 2001 in Gardner v. AMR, U.S. Dist. Court (Los Angeles) Mr. Steering obtained a $650,000.00 settlement of wrongful death, for failure to provide ambulance service. Although AMR is a private ambulance service Mr. Steering successfully argued that AMR was acting under the color of state law as they were the only ambulance service allowed to service the Hemet are of Riverside County.

In Risk v. Cathedral City, U.S. District Court (Riverside)(2006) Mr. Steering obtained a $125,000.00 settlement for false arrest / excessive force.

In Torres v. County of Riverside, U.S. District Court, Central District of California (Riverside)(2010), Mr. Steering obtained a $500,000.00 settlement for unreasonable force (i.e. taser).

In 2016 in the case of Licitra v. County of Riverside (U.S. District Court – Riverside) Mr. Steering obtained a $300,000.00 settlement for false arrest / unreasonable force.

In Chynoweth v. County of Riverside, Riverside County Superior Court (2011), Mr. Steering obtained a

$750,000.00 settlement for unreasonable force.

In 2012 Mr. Steering also obtained an $825,000.00 from the Riverside County City of Desert Hot Springs, for unreasonable force and false arrest (Moore, et al. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, Riverside County Superior Court;

Mr. Steering also obtained $400,000.00 from Riverside County for the arrest of a San Jacinto High School student by a School Resourse Officer. See, Ex-high school student gets $400,000 from Riverside County (steeringlaw.com).

Mr. Steering also obtained $475,000.00 from the County of Riverside for the arrest of a man witnessing Riverside County Sheriff’s Department deputy sheriffs beat a man who crashed his vehicle pursuant to a vehicle pursuit. See, Danny Eatherton v. County of Riverside.

If you have been the Victim of Police Misconduct or other Civil Rights violations, please call or email Mr. Steering and he will respond to your inquiry.

Thank you, and best of luck, whatever your needs.

Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering

Jerry L. Steering, Esq.

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Victorville – Apple Valley Excessive Force Attorney

Jerry L. Steering Interviewed on KABCVictorville – Apple Valley Excessive Force Attorney Jerry L. Steering, Esq., is a Police Misconduct Attorney, who sues police officers for, among other things, the use of excessive force upon civilians. His law practice involves serving, among other places, Victorville, Apple Valley, and the San Bernardino County areas and cities shown below. Mr. Steering also represents persons in both civil and criminal cases and is an expert in brutality / excessive force and false arrest cases; both civil and criminal. Mr. Steering has successfully sued San Bernardino County police agencies successfully, for many years now.

POLICE BRUTALITY IN THE HIGH DESERT.

For whatever reason, police brutality in the Victor Valley has gone off of the charts. The City of Victorville is the hotbed these days for crazed cops, who apparently really take great pleasure in shooting innocents, and beating and false arresting their “prey.”

The San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department contracts with the City of Apple Valley for their police services, and if your a fan of outrageous police shootings, beating and false arrest, Victorville is the place for you.

In 2015 these violent crazed deputies of the High Desert were caught on video recording viciously beating a man named Francis Pusok who literally attempted to escape from them on horseback.

There was a Sheriff’s Department helicopter that was flying over the foot pursuit by the deputies so when the news helicopter was flying over the Sheriff’s Department helicopter the deputies didn’t know that the news helicopter was there. As a result the deputies carried on their vicious and brutal attack of Mr. Pusok, such as the deputy seen literally kicking the surrendering suspect directly in his testicles. See, “DA files charges against 3 deputies in Francis Pusok beating“.

Had the news helicopter not been there and secreted by the noise of the Sheriff’s Department chopper, Mr. Pusok would have been charged with at least violation of Cal. Penal Code Section 69; using force and violence to prevent / attempt to prevent public officer from performing duty of their office (See, “Cal. Penal Code Section 69; The Hammer Of Oppression – Police Misconduct Attorney“); standard operating procedure for the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department.

These deputies know that when they beat, torture or even kill civilians, even totally innocent ones, that San Bernardino County District Attorney Mike Ramos will prosecute their victims with some sort of “resistance offense” to beat them down (i.e. the financial costs and emotional toll of having to defend oneself on bogus criminal charges) to take a plea that will preclude the victim of police abuse from successfully suing the deputies for their constitutional violations. See, “”The “Contempt of Cop Game”; How Well Can You Play?“”. On May 15, 2013 District Attorney Ramos stated as much; that his office will not be dismissed any cases involving “Crimes Against Peace Officers” (“CAPO”) (See, “San Bernardino County DA Launches New Unit For Crimes Against Police Officers“).

Here are a few examples of several of the false arrest / excessive force cases that Mr. Steering has had against San Bernardino County:

Morgan v. County of San Bernardino, U.S. Dist. Court, Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Riverside), (1996), $714,000.00 jury verdict (included compromised attorney’s fees) for excessive force and false arrest during search warrant execution in Apple Valley, California;

Darr v. County of San Bernardino, U.S. Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Riverside)(2000), $50,000.00 settlement for violation of first amendment right to freedom of association;

Austin v. County of San Bernardino, U.S. District Court, Central District of California (2002), $500,000.00 jury verdict for false arrest and excessive force;

Lopez v. County of San Bernardino, U.S. Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Riverside) (2002), $50,000.00 settlement for racially motivated battery;

Miller v. City of San Bernardino, et al, U.S. Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Riverside) (2003), $35,000.00 settlement for unlawful detention;

Calderon v. County of San Bernardino, U.S. Dist. Court, Central Dist. of Cal. (Riverside)(2003), $115,000.00 settlement for false arrest and illegal search;

Arroyo v. City of San Bernardino, U.S. Dist. Court, Central Dist. of Cal. (Riverside)(2004), $125,000.00 settlement for unreasonable seizure of person;

Ford v. County of San Bernardino, (2007), $80,000.00 settlement for excessive force;

Garcia v. County of San Bernardino, U.S. District Court – Riverside (2008), $95,000.00 settlement for failure to protect inmate at Glen Helen Jail;

Diaz v. County of San Bernardino, et al., United States District Court – Riverside (2008), $49,999.00 settlement for excessive force;

In re Jane Doe v. County of San Bernardino, et al., (2008), $290,000.00 settlement (prior to filing lawsuit) for sexually motivated mistreatment of arrestee;

Grasso v. County of San Bernardino, et al. (2009), $180,000.00 settlement for unreasonable force / infliction of emotional distress;

Aubry v. County of San Bernardino, et al, U.S. Dist. Court (LA) (2012), $325,000.00 settlement for the use of unreasonable force and for false arrest;

Trent v. County of San Bernardino, U.S. District Court (Riverside) (2013); $600,000.00 settlement for unreasonable force and unlawful seizure of person;

Jones v. County of San Bernardino, U.S. District Court (Los Angeles) 2017; $170,000.00 settlement for unreasonable seizure of person.

Jerry L. Steering, Esq.

Orange County Police Misconduct Summary

Police Misconduct AttorneyORANGE COUNTY POLICE MISCONDUCT SUMMARY

Jerry L. Steering, Esq., is a Police Misconduct Lawyer, serving, among other places, Orange County, and the Orange County cities shown below.

Mr. Steering has been suing police officers, and defending bogus criminal cases (mostly bogus crimes against police officers), for 29 years. The majority of our firm’s law practice, is suing police officers and other government officials, for claims such as false arrest, police brutality /excessive force, malicious prosecution, and other “Constitutional Torts” , including police whistleblowing cases (Cal. Labor Code Section 1102.5.)

Jerry L. Steering represents the victims of ”Police Misconduct”, such as thevictim of the use of excessive force and false arrests of innocents. Mr. Steering’s law practice serves Orange County, and the Orange County cities shown below, as well as Ventura County, LA County, San Diego County, Riverside County and San Bernardino County. He has successfully handled many against Orange County law enforcement agencies, including cases against the Orange County Sheriff’s Department and local police agencies, such as:

Gomez v. County of Orange, et al., U.S. Dist. Court, Central District of California (LA) (2011) obtained $2,163,799.53 for unreasonable force on convicted jail inmate;

Torrance v. County of Orange, et al., U.S. District Court, Central District of California (Santa Ana)(2010); obtained $380,000.00 for unreasonable force and false arrest;

Chamberlain v. County of Orange et al., U.S. District Court, Central District of California (Santa Ana)(2009); obtained $600,000.00 for failure to protect pre-trial detainee in Orange County Jail;

Baima v. County of Orange, et al; U.S. District Court, Central District of California (Santa Ana)(2003); obtained $208,000.00 for false arrest / unreasonable force.

Celli v. County of Orange, et al; U.S. District Court, Central District of California (Santa Ana)(2009); obtained $200,000.00 for false arrest / unreasonable force.

Richard “Danny” Page v. City of Tustin , et al., U.S. District Court (Santa Ana) (1992); $450,000.00 for false arrest and unreasonable force.

Farahani v. City of Santa Ana; Mr. Steering obtained a $612,000.00 jury verdict against a Santa Ana Police Department officer for unreasonable force, for a single baton strike to a young man’s head. Farahani v. City of Santa Ana; United States District Court, Central District of California.

Butano v. County of Orange, et al.; U.S. Dist. Court, Central District of California (Santa Ana) (2013); $727,500.00 for false arrest and unreasonable force.

Sharp v. City of Garden Grove, Orange County Superior Court (2000): Mr. Steering obtained a $1,110,000.00 jury verdict against Garden Grove Police Department officers, along with a CHP officer and state parole agents, for the warrantless search of the body shop that was owned by the parolee’s father, and where the parolee worked when he wasn’t in prison. The parole department had denied GGPD Narcotics Bureau permission to do a “parole search” of the plaintiff father’s body shop, as they had no authority to do so. Parole agents can’t do (or authorize others to do) warrantless “parole searches” of places where parolees are employed. Imagine a parolee getting a job as a mechanic at Pep Boys. Could state parole agents and police officers do a parole search of Pep Boys? Of Course Not. State parole knew this, and they told GGPD Narcotics the same. However, GGPD Narcotics decided to use the pretext of a parole search, to do a full blown warrantless search of the Dad’s auto body shop, for a suspected meth lab, because the son / parolee’s parole officer wanted to violate the son’s parole for dirty drug tests, and was tired of waiting for GGPD to find him “cooking meth” at the Dad’s body shop GGPD had asked the Parole Agent not to violate the son / parolee’s parole, until they could catch him in the act of meth “cooking” at the Dad’s body shop; something that the mere appearance of in itself should be sufficient to dispel and such suspicion. The body shop was triangular, the hypotenuse of which, was wide open (no blinds or shades) to anyone standing on the sidewalk. The sidewalk side also had two wide entry bays, as did the rear side, the shop and doors were wide open all day, with all areas (save the lavatories) visible to any interested parties. The body shop also had an EPA approved vapor blower exhaust fan and roof portal, and any “dirty socks” odor from a meth lab, would have been blown all over the neighborhood. No reasonable officer would have really believed that the body shop was being used as a drug lab.

After several failed parole test drug tests by the son / parolee, his Parole Agent was getting more anxious to violate the son / parolee’s parole. So, the geniuses at the GGPD, the CHP and state parole (both members of OCATT; Orange County Auto-Theft task force.) They stormed into the body shop with SWAT / raid type gear, rifles and pistols blazing, ran-up from behind Mr. Sharp and pointed a shotgun at him. Then the cuffed-him (still at gunpoint) and made him get down onto the cement floor of his shop, with his hands cuffed behind him. One might imagine that this might result in knee injury to a 59 year old man, and one would be right. However, Mr. Sharp treated his own condition with health food supplements (Glucosamine Chondroitin). The constables then ransacked the body shop, with Mr. Sharp still cuffed, lying on the floor of his shop, with the neighboring businesses wondering why their business neighbor, who they always knew as a kind and generous man, was being treated like some despicable sub-human type, and in such a degrading and humiliating manner.

In addition to first claiming the the officers warrantless invasion of the shop and the seizure of Mr. Sharp (something ultimately rejected by the court) the cops also claimed that the search was justified as a warrantless search for stolen vehicle parts pursuant to Cal. Veh. Code § 2805; a real stretch (body shops don’t call in VIN numbers on cars brought in for repair. They are also neither U.S. Customs, nor the police. They’re not buying the car; they’re just fixing it.)

The Orange County Superior Court jury awarded Mr. Sharp $1,010,000.00 (ten thousand dollars of which was for punitive damages against the most culpable parole agent.) They didn’t believe the police; probably because they lied through their teeth, and finally violated someone who was just like one of them; the Orange County jurors (i.e. white, businessman with a trade, married High School sweetheart, enlisted in United States Marines, no criminal record, wife blond and very nice.) The GGPD officer who lead the raid on the body shop is now a Captain at GGPD.

Oliver v. City of Anaheim, U.S. District Court, Santa Ana; Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 2012; (plaintiff won case in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on their unlawful arrest claim; false arrest as matter of law.) Plaintiffs obtained $400,000.00 for four hour false arrest of father (and son), for father telling police that he didn’t know of his son hit a opossum with a shovel (which isn’t a crime anyway),so busted the father for violation of Cal. Penal Code 32 (i.e. “accessory to crime”, for not incriminating his son, for something that isn’t a crime. See, Oliver v. City of Anaheim; Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Mr. Steering has also had many acquittals in Orange County Superior Court; especially in cases involving false arrests.

EXCESSIVE FORCE, FALSE ARREST AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CASES

Mr. Steering has been suing police officers, and defending bogus criminal cases of crimes against police officers, since 1984. The majority of our firm’s law practice, is suing police officers and other government officials, for claims such as false arrest, police brutality / excessive force, malicious prosecution, and other “Constitutional Torts“, and defending bogus criminal cases against the victims of such abuse by the police; almost always for the same incident that the civilian – victim sues for.

WHAT IS “EXCESSIVE FORCE”?

The Politics Of The Judge Or Jurors Are The Major Determinate Factor In Excessive Force Cases

In the real world, in real Courts with real juries and real judges, a determination as to whether a peace officer used “Excessive Force” in a any given situation, is as much of a political question, as a factual one. It is the trier of fact’s (the jury’s) political persuasion, their life experiences with law enforcement, and their world view, that is most likely the determinate factor in any a police brutality / excessive force cases.

Civilians who are (almost always falsely) accused of battering a peace officer, very often get criminally prosecuted for not cooperating with the beating fast enough, so as to constitute a “resisting” or “obstructing” or “delaying” of a peace officer engaged in the performance of his/her official duties; Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1); the most abused Section in the California Penal Code, and the most ambiguous, amorphous, and abused law in California (See our Tab for “Contempt of Cop Cases”, above.) The Section 148(a)(1) charge is either a throw-in for a more serious assault and battery of a peace officer charge (95% of which are bogus), or the base criminal charge itself.

Because of the ambiguous / amorphous language of Section 148(a)(1), a white jury has free reign to criminalize “failures of the attitude test“, when they believe that they would have acted otherwise (even though if some cops walked-up to them on the street and ordered them to prone-out and spread ‘em, they would throw a fit. ) A different jury, however, one not so white and Republican (the cops can do no wrong), say one in Compton, California, are likely to have a different view of the world, a different view of the police and a totally different verdict in an excessive force case.

Excessive Force In The Real World; The Rodney King Case.

Rodney King may have been and may represent a lot of things to a lot of people, but he still was a haphazard petty criminal. Let’s no make no mistake about that. He is not a role model or a martyr. He was just some man who got beat-up by the LAPD on March 3, 1991, whose beating happened to by video recorded by an amateur photographer. However, back in 1991, if you did have a video camera, it was most likely one that uses a full-sized VHS tape, and was used by propping it on top of one’s shoulder while filming. Nowadays, every 12 year old has an iPhone and could record a much better image. There are a lot of people getting beaten-up today by the police, but still, none that had the international impact than Rodney King’s beating did.

Rodney King, a man who first evaded a traffic stop by LAPD for errant driving, and who eventually stopped his vehicle, got his a__ kicked by pursuing LAPD officers. Mr. King’s beating was captured on a video recording, that showed several LAPD officers clobbering Mr. King with their batons, and beating and kicking him; all of it being obviously just plain wrong and cruel.

The Rodney King Case; The Jurors In Simi Valley Find No Wrong By Police.

LAPD police officers Stacey Koon, Laurence Powell, Timothy Wind, and Theodore Briseno were criminally charged by LA County District Attorney Gil Garcetti with using unreasonable force on a Rodney King, and other nasties. Mr. Garcetti was confident that his video recording of Rodney King’s beating showing outrageous force by the LAPD, that even the fine people of Simi Valley would see things his way, and that convictions of the LAPD officers was imminent.

However, the defendant officers obtained a change of venue, to the California Superior Court in Simi Valley, Ventura County, California. The media had already convicted the four cops who got criminally prosecuted for the March 3, 1991 beating, but the geniuses in the LA County District Attorney’s Office and those in the media forgot one thing; that even now, Simi Valley is only 1.26% African-American, and that most of them are probably cops or cop lovers (otherwise, they wouldn’t move there.) Convincing them that the Constables were the bad guys, and that the fleeing intoxicated motorist is the victim, is like trying to convince Billy Graham that there is no God. Sorry, you’re not going to do it.

On April 29, 1992 the jury in the Ventura County Superior Court (Simi Valley) criminal case, found that the defendant LAPD officers didn’t use “Excessive Force” upon Rodney King on March 3, 1991, and acquitted Stacey Koon, Laurence Powell, Timothy Wind, and Theodore Briseno of all charges. LA went crazy.

Some people reacted with disbelief to the jury verdicts; others reacted in anger. A crowd outside the Ventura County Courthouse shouted “Guilty! Guilty!” as the defendants were escorted away by sheriff’s deputies. According to Rodney King’s bodyguard, Tom Owens, King sat “absolutely motionless” as he watched in “pure disbelief” the televised verdicts being read. A visibly angry Mayor Tom Bradley publicly declared, “Today, the jury told the world that what we all saw with our own eyes was not a crime.”

Sixty-two minutes after the King verdict, five black male youths entered a Korean-owned Pay-less Liquor and Deli at Florence and Dalton Avenues. The youths each grabbed bottles of malt liquor and headed out the door, where they were blocked by the son of the store’s owner, David Lee. One young man smashed Lee on the head with a bottle, while two others shattered the storefront with their thrown bottles. One of the youths shouted, “This is for Rodney King!” The deadly LA riots of 1992 were underway.

Events grew increasingly ugly. Black youths with baseball bats battered a car driven by a white. Another white driver was hit in the face by a chunk of concrete thrown threw his car windshield. Police faced gangs of rock and bottle-throwing youths. The taunting, missile-hurling crowds grew in size, forcing the police to beat a hasty retreat out of the riot area. The Florence-Neighborhood is left to the anarchy of the mob attacking helpless civilians.

Perhaps the most horrific image of the riots involved mild-mannered truck driver Reginald Denny. Denny was at the wheel of his eighteen-wheeler, carrying a load of sand and listening to country music, when at 6:46 P.M. he entered the intersection at Normandie and Florence. A helicopter overhead captured on videotape what occurred next. Denny was pulled from his truck into the street, where he was kicked and then beaten on the head with a claw hammer. The most vicious attack came from Damian Williams who smashed a block of concrete on Denny’s head at point-blank range, knocking him unconscious and fracturing his head in ninety-one places. The helicopter camera recorded Williams doing a victory dance as he gleefully pointed out Denny’s bloodied figure.

The Governor called-out the National Guard, who even deployed in full Combat gear, even in the County Courthouses. When the rioting finally ended five days later, fifty-four people (mostly Koreans and Latinos) were dead–the greatest death toll in any American civil disturbance since the 1863 Draft Riots in New York City. Hundreds of people (including sixty firefighters) were injured. Looting and fires had resulted in more than one billion dollars in property damage. Whole neighborhoods in south central LA, such as Korea town, looked like war zones. Over 7,000 persons were arrested.

Even as the rioting continued, President George Bush and Attorney General William Barr began the process of bringing federal charges against the four LAPD officers accused in the King case. On the day after the Simi Valley verdict, Bush issued a statement declaring that the verdict “has left us all with a deep sense of personal frustration and anguish.” In a May 1, 1993 televised address to the nation, Bush all but promised a federal prosecution of the officers.

The Rodney King Case; Here Come The Feds.

Prosecuting the officers on the federal charge of violating King’s civil rights accomplished two Bush Administration goals. The first goal was to control the rage that had developed in black communities. The second was to reduce demands from some in the civil rights community for sweeping investigations into police misconduct.

On May 7, federal prosecutors began presenting evidence to a LA grand jury. On August 4, the grand jury returned indictments against the three officers for “willfully and intentionally using unreasonable force” and against Koon for “willfully permitting and failing to take action to stop the unlawful assault.” on King.

Unlike the Simi Valley jury, the federal jury was racially mixed. Although the defense made a considerable effort to exclude African-Americans, two blacks were seated as jurors. One of the two, Marian Escobel (“Juror No. 7), sent an early signal of the difficulty she would cause the defense when she was overheard strongly criticizing the defense’s treatment of other potential black jurors. In one of his most important trial rulings, Judge Davies denied a defense motion to remove Escobel from the jury–perhaps because he understood that the juror accurately perceived the defense conduct. A second problem for the defense resulted from their focus on excluding African-American jurors: they gave insufficient attention to identifying and excluding white jurors who were especially fearful of producing a verdict that would cause more rioting.

In addition to a more favorable jury, the prosecution had other advantages in the second trial. Clymer noted later that the government “had the advantage of seeing everything that had gone wrong in the first trial.” Clymer excluded from the witness list those witnesses who had backfired in Simi Valley. He avoided juror suspicion that the prosecution was hiding something by calling Rodney King to the stand. He came up with a medical expert who would prove King’s facial injury came from a baton blow, not the asphalt. He identified a credible use-of-force expert, Mark Conta, who countered the testimony of the defense’s expert. He used cross-examination to suggest that defense police witnesses were friends seeking to bail the defendants out of a tight spot. Finally, he presented new and potentially damaging facts to present to the jury, such as Powell taking King on a ninety-minute detour to Foothill Station after leaving Pacifica Hospital, rather than directly to the USC Medical Center, as Koon had requested. Clymer hoped that the jury might conclude the detour was made to show off their injured “trophy.”

King may have been an ex-con who had given wildly different accounts of his beating, but he came across on the stand as an uneducated man was either too drunk or confused to remember events, not as a sophisticated liar. Through King’s testimony, the jurors saw a man who seemed to have been in genuine fear of his life. He also raised the issue of race. Although he at first had denied that race had anything to do with his beating, he told the jury that as he was being hit, the officers “were chanting either ‘What’s up killer? How do you feel killer? [or] What’s up nigger?” Asked whether the word used was “killer” or “nigger,” King answered, “I’m not sure.” Watching King testify, defense attorney Stone worried. He saw King as “very polite and mild-mannered and thoughtful” and that, he said, “spells credibility.”

On April 10, 1993 two LAPD officers, Sgt. Stacey Koon and Laurence Powell, were convicted in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241; violation of federal Constitutional rights under the color of law; felonies, for beating-up Rodney King. The Rodney King convictions would reshape the entire issue of the excessive use of force by the police in America. Unfortunately, White Republicans don’t see the world any differently.

LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF EXCESSIVE FORCE.

The United States Supreme Court has defined “Excessive Force” as follows:

“Where, as here, the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right “to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures” of the person . . . . . . . Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ” ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ ” against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Id., at 8, 105 S.Ct., at 1699, quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 22-27, 88 S.Ct., at 1880-1883. Because “the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), however, its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S., at 8-9, 105 S.Ct., at 1699-1700 (the question is “whether the totality of the circumstances justifies a particular sort of . . . seizure”).” (See, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989.)

“The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. See Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S., at 20-22, 88 S.Ct., at 1879-1881. The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause, even though the wrong person is arrested, Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971), nor by the mistaken execution of a valid search warrant on the wrong premises, Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987). With respect to a claim of excessive force, the same standard of reasonableness at the moment applies: “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,” Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d, at 1033, violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.

As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, however, the “reasonableness” inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-139, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723-1724, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978); see also Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S., at 21, 88 S.Ct., at 1879 (in analyzing the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure, “it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard”). An officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional. See, Scott v. United States, supra, 436 U.S., at 138, 98 S.Ct., at 1723, citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973).”

In Graham, we held that claims of excessive force in the context of arrests or investigatory stops should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendments objective reasonableness standard, not under substantive due process principles. 490 U.S., at 388, 394. Because police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation, id., at 397, the reasonableness of the officers belief as to the appropriate level of force should be judged from that on-scene perspective. Id., at 396. We set out a test that cautioned against the 20/20 vision of hindsight in favor of deference to the judgment of reasonable officers on the scene. Id., at 393, 396. Graham sets forth a list of factors relevant to the merits of the constitutional excessive force claim, requir[ing] careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id., at 396. If an officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely to fight back, for instance, the officer would be justified in using more force than in fact was needed.” (See, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), Kennedy, J.)

So, the Supreme Court (Justice Kennedy writing for the Majority) has essentially defined “excessive force” as basically force that is “unreasonable” in the abstract; that is, force that is greater than the amount of force that a reasonably well trained officer would have used under the same circumstances. Not so bad. Right? Not really. Here’s why.

THE PROBLEM WITH GRAHAM’S OBJECTIVE “REASONABLE OFFICER IN THE ABSTRACT STANDARD” IN THE REAL WORLD – THE ANALYSIS FOR WHETHER YOU CAN ACTUALLY SUE THE OFFICER FOR EXCESSIVE FORCE ISN’T ALL THAT OBJECTIVE.

The problem with the description of how what excessive force is defined, is not the Supreme Court’s strong emphasis on the officer’s conduct being based on an “objective” standard; they hypothetical reasonable officer in the abstract. The problem is that this claim of objective reasonableness is bogus, for the subject belief of the subject officer is nonetheless considered in the excessive force analysis.

As shown above in the last sentence of the block quote from Saucier v. Katz:

“If an officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely to fight back, for instance, the officer would be justified in using more force than in fact was needed.” (See, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).)

How can the standard really be an objective one, if the subject officer’s mistaken yet is considered at all? How can one mistakenly but reasonably believe something? What Saucier really says, and what that case was all about, is whether a reasonably well trained officer in the abstract, could have reasonably believed, that a particular use of force is reasonable, when the same reasonably well trained officer in the abstract, would believe that the use of force was unreasonable? Huh? This is more Orwellian newspeak:

“The concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct. It is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts. An officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances. If the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.” See, Saucier v. Katz; Majority Opinion by Justice Kennedy.

So, according to Justice Kennedy, although the reasonable force determination is one that is to be made in the abstract, when it comes to whether a particular police officer should be held liable for his Constitutional violations, objectivity goes out the window, and a reasonably mistaken belief by a particular defendant officer, is a sufficient defense to civil liability? So, one can reasonably act unreasonably. George Orwell would be proud of the Justice Kennedy’s fluency with newspeak.

THE PROBLEM WITH GRAHAM’S OBJECTIVE “REASONABLE OFFICER STANDARD” IN THE REAL WORLD – THE WATCHMAN GETS TO MAKE HIS OWN RULES THAT REGULATE HIS OWN CONDUCT

The problem is, that the standards in the police profession for what is “reasonable” or otherwise proper police conduct in a given situation, are generally neither the creature of legislation (i.e. state law requiring the audio recording of custodial police interrogations) nor the product of any judicially created mandate, duty, or prohibition (i.e. Constitutional limits on conduct and judicially created “exclusionary rule”.) The conduct of “the objectively reasonable officer”; that standard that the Supreme Court attempted to describe in Graham v. O’Connor and Saucier v. Katz, is created by the very persons whose conduct the Fourth Amendment is supposed to impose limits on. Thus, in a very real sense, the Supreme Court has set the standard (“objectively reasonable officer”) that the Fourth Amendment requires, but has delegated the details of what’s reasonable or not, to the police.

It’s letting the regulated enact their own regulations. It’s like letting the local power company, set the rate of profit that they should make; set the formula for how the amount of profit is determined; set how much they can spend on public relations (since they’re a monopoly), and how, when, by whom and in what manner, they should be inspected, what they can and can’t do in their industry, and every other aspect of the business. If they want to all use tasers on civilians, then that’s reasonable. If they all want to pepper-spray persons because their hands in their pockets, then that’s reasonable. If they want to prone-out everyone at gun point that they detain, then that’s reasonable. At the end of the day, in the real world police world, if the technique, method, procedure, policy or practice reduces the danger level to the officer, you can bet that, eventually, they will find a way to justify such technique, method, procedure, policy or practice , and make such otherwise unreasonable behavior, “reasonable”, for no other reason than the police would prefer to act that way; Constitutional or not. You see the problem. The police have an old slogan: “It’s better to be judged by 12, then carried by 6.” It’s another way of saying, I’ll act in a way that is in my self interest; not yours, and if I happen to trample your Constitutional rights, so be it.

THE PROBLEM WITH GRAHAM’S OBJECTIVE “REASONABLE OFFICER STANDARD” IN THE REAL WORLD – QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.

As shown in the last sentence of the quote from Saucier v. Katz, immediately above:

“If an officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely to fight back, for instance, the officer would be justified in using more force than in fact was needed.” (See, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).) What does that mean? It means whie

In a nutshell, the Qualified Immunity is an immunity from a lawsuit for violation of a civilian’s Constitutional rights, when those rights were actually violated, but a reasonably well trained police officer could have believed that his conduct did not constitute such Constitutional violation. So, even if the police officer actually violated your Constitutional Rights, he may be immune from suit, because the law was not clearly established enough at the time of the violation, to hold a police officer liable for his conduct. This is a doctrine “contrived” by the conservative members of the Supreme Court (since 1981), to ensure that you can’t do anything about (or at least do a whole lot less about) your Constitutional Rights being trampled by the government.

So, for example, if the police come-up with a whole new technique to restrain people, such as a with a taser, or pepper-spray, or pepper-balls, or water-balls, or hobbling (police hog tying), or a shock-belting, or stun-gunning, the officer may very well be entitled to qualified immunity from being sued for the misuse of any of the above-mentioned devices; not because its “reasonable”, but because the police just use those devices in such manners; thereby giving the Courts an excused to relieve the police officer from liability for the damage caused by his violation of the Constitutional Rights of civilians:

“Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)) . . . Accordingly, we must resolve immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation. Pearson, 129, S.Ct. at 815.

An officer will be denied qualified immunity in a 1983 action only if (1) the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury, show that the officers conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the incident such that a reasonable officer would have understood her conduct to be unlawful in that situation. Saucier, 533 at 201-02; Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011.) To assist the development of constitutional precedent, we exercise our sound discretion to follow Saucier’s conventional two-step procedure and address first whether the Torres Family has alleged the violation of a constitutional right. See, Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 818.

The qualified immunity analysis involves two separate steps. First, the court determines whether the facts show the officers conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001.) If the alleged violate a constitutional right, then the defendants are entitled to immunity and the claim must be dismissed. However, if the alleged conduct did violate such a right, then the court must determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged unlawful action. Id.

A right is clearly established if a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Id., at 202. If the right is not clearly established, then the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. While the order in which these questions are addressed is left to the courts sound discretion, it is often beneficial to perform the analysis in the sequence outlined above. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818 (2009.) Of course, where a claim of qualified immunity is to be denied, both questions must be answered.

When determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact at the summary judgment stage, the court must take all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. In the context of qualified immunity, determinations that turn on questions of law, such as whether the officers had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to support their actions, are appropriately decided by the court. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993.)

However, a trial court should not grant summary judgment when there is a genuine dispute as to the facts and circumstances within an officers knowledge or what the officer and claimant did or failed to do. Id.” (Saucier v. Katz, supra.)

So, according to Justice Kennedy, although the reasonable force determination is one that is to be made in the abstract, when it comes to whether a particular police officer should be held liable for his Constitutional violations, objectivity goes out the window, and a reasonably mistaken belief by a particular defendant officer, is a sufficient defense to civil liability? So, one can reasonably act unreasonably.

WHY THE POLICE CRIMINALLY PROSECUTE THEIR VICTIMS

Unfortunately, because of institutional pressures (i.e. “ratting out fellow officer not a good career move), and the obvious political and practical consequences of not backing-up the their fellow officers, the norm in today’s police profession, is for peace officers to falsely arrest their “victims”, and to author false police reports to procure the bogus criminal prosecutions (i.e. to literally “frame” others) of those civilians whose Constitutional rights and basic human dignity have been violated; to justify what they did, and to act in conformity with that justification. The excessive force victims get criminally prosecuted, for crimes that they didn’t commit; usually for crimes such as “Resisting / obstructing / delaying a peace officer in the lawful performance of their duties (Cal. Penal Code148(a)(1)), assault on a peace officer (Cal. Penal Code § 240 / 241), “battery on a peace officer (Cal. Penal Code § 242 / 243(b)) (which is almost always, in reality, battery by a peace officer; otherwise known as “Excessive Force” or “Unreasonable Force”), and resisting officer with actual or threat of violence (Cal. Penal § Code 69.) Section 69 is a “wobbler” under California law; a crime that the government can charge as either a misdemeanor or a felony. This charge is usually reserved for cases in which the police use substantial force on the innocent arrestee (the real “victim”), and need to falsely claim more violent / serious conduct by the “victim” to justify their outrages.

So, for example, the crime of “battery on a peace officer” (Cal. Penal Code § 242 / 243(b)), is almost always, in reality, “battery by a peace officer”; otherwise known as “Excessive Force”; an “unreasonable seizure” of a person under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (See, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).)

If you have been the victim of Excessive Force by a police officer, please check our Section, above, entitled: “What To Do If You Have Been Beaten-Up Or False Arrested By The Police“. Also, please click on “Home“, above, or the other pages shown, for the information or assistance that we can provide for you. If you need to speak with a lawyer about your particular legal situation, please call the Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering for a free telephone consultation.

MOST FALSE ARRESTS ARE EFFORTS BY POLICE OFFICERS TO PROTECT THEMSELVES FROM CIVIL, CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY, FOR OTHER WRONGFUL ACTS COMMITTED BY THEM

Police Misconduct is rampant and condoned and defended by the command structure of most, if not all, modern police agencies. Modern police agencies are afraid of losing their “power” in and over a community. That “power base”, is based in large part, on the public “supporting the police”. That popular support is based upon a belief by the body politic, that: 1) police officers have a difficult and dangerous job, 2) that they’re basically honest, 3) that only a small percentage of them would commit perjury, 4) that the force that the police use on people is almost always justified (if not legally, then morally), and that 5) police are capable of policing themselves. Although none of these beliefs are accurate, one cannot ignore the belief system of the majority of the white / affluent American populace, in understanding why police officers routinely, and without a second thought, falsely arrest civilians, and commit other outrages against innocents.

Wrongful police beatings, accompanied by their sister “false arrests”, are a common and every day occurrence. These beating / arrests are no longer limited to persons of color. Soccer Moms, airline pilots and school teachers, beware: because of the great (and ever expanding) powers being given to police officers by the Supreme Court, described below, in a very real way, you no longer have the right to question, protest or challenge police actions, since to do so usually results in your being physically abused and falsely arrested on trumped of charges of essentially, “Contempt Of Cop”; (i.e. maybe not getting on the ground fast enough, or failing to walk-over to the officer fast enough; some type of failing the attitude test.)

Unfortunately, because of institutional pressures (i.e. “ratting out fellow officer not a good career move) and the obvious political and practical consequences of not backing-up the their fellow officers, the norm in today’s police profession, is for peace officers to falsely arrest civilians, and to author false police reports, to procure the bogus criminal prosecutions (i.e. to literally “frame”) of those civilians whose Constitutional rights and basic human dignity have been violated by them. After all; how would it look if a police officer beat you up, and didn’t arrest you. Because most police officers, including those that step-over Constitutional “line in the sand” (i.e. beating another, falsely accusing civilians of crimes), are not true sociopaths, when they falsely charge you with a crime, it isn’t usually too serious of one. Most are bogus claims for violation of Cal. Penal Code 148(a)(1), because the crime of “resisting or obstructing or delaying a peace officer who’s engaged in the performance of his/her duties” is incredibly ambiguous, and can (ingenuously or ignorantly) be applied to almost any conduct by a person (i.e. the defendant yelled at me for restraining [torturing] the “suspect”, so he delayed me from arresting the “suspect” because I had to look his way and take a protective stance in the events that the defendant charged at me.)

WHY THE COPS CAN GET USUALLY GET AWAY WITH IT; AMERICANS’ BELIEF SYSTEM ABOUT POLICE OFFICERS

Most Americans have a deeply held belief that police officers don’t beat-up civilians who don’t deserve it. People believe what they want to believe, and they don’t want to believe that the persons entrusted with their safety, routinely beat-up and “frame” innocents; often for fun, or to bolster their frail egos. However, in the real world, many police officers do just that. A substantial minority of peace officers actually do beat, torture and falsely arrest those that defy their authority, or somehow bruise their fragile egos. Thus, in the real world, the crime of “battery on a peace officer (Cal. Penal Code § 242 / 243(b)), is almost always, in reality, battery by a peace officer; otherwise known as “excessive force” or “Unreasonable Force”, and the crime of resisting arrest (resisting or obstructing or delaying a peace officer; Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1)), is almost always the choice crime to arrest a civilian who committed no crime. The police can fairly easily obtain convictions of their victims for “resisting / obstructing / delaying a peace officer”, because almost any conduct by a civilian can be characterized as falling within the ambit of that statute; especially conduct that jurors find themselves believing is not the way that they would have handled that situation.

WHY THE COPS CAN GET USUALLY GET AWAY WITH IT; THE JURORS

To attack the jury system is to attack an institution that has been the primary barrier between oppression and freedom in the English speaking world since 1215. This is not an attack on the jury system. It is merely a reflection as to why in false arrest,unreasonable force and malicious prosecution cases, The way that a jury decides these type of cases is as much political, as it is an exercise in fact finding. The persons who ultimately get to sit on juries in these cases, have no real idea as to how police officers actually act, and have no idea how truly institutionally corrupt, police agencies really are when it comes to defending the County / City coffers and their and the politicians’ images.

In both civil and criminal cases, the parties have some say in the composition of the jury. The jury pool are supposedly called randomly, and the Court and the lawyers get to ask them questions. That part of a trial, questioning potential jurors, is called voir dire, that in French means, to speak the truth. Each side gets a certain numbers of peremptory challenges, that they can use to strike persons from sitting as jurors. In a federal court civil rights case, each side usually gets four peremptory challenges. So far, sounds fair. Here’s the rub.

Most people who have actually seen police officers beat-up a civilian have a lasting terrible feeling about police misconduct. Almost invariably, when they are asked by the lawyers or the Court about whether their prior experience with police misconduct will cause them to be prejudice against either side, they almost always say Yes. Most such people who have seen police beatings and the false prosecutions of their friends, are so deeply affected, that they invariably tell the Court that they are biased against police officers (in this type of case), and that they cant really put-aside that bias and be completely fair and impartial. Once they make that statement, any such jurors are then routinely excused for cause from sitting on that jury. Thus, the jurors who would more likely be favorable to the civil rights plaintiff (or criminal defendant accused of some crime against a peace officer), is excused for cause from sitting on the jury. The lawyer defending the case for the police doesn’t even had to use one of their jury peremptory challenges to get rid of that juror. All of the others jurors who do get to sit, are people who have never seen police misconduct; leaving a jury that, unfortunately, have no concept of the way that police, and police organizations, actually act.

Therefore, when Miss, Mrs. or Mr. Citizen gets falsely arrested, beaten-up or maliciously prosecuted by police agencies, and gets criminally prosecuted for conduct that often isn’t criminal (i.e. “creative use” of the California criminal statute Penal Code Section 148(a)(1)), these “sanitized jurors” will generally not believe that the police really did what Miss, Mrs. or Mr. Citizen claim that they did, unless Miss, Mrs. or Mr. Citizen’s attorney can really prove otherwise; real proof; like a video, audio, or a bus load of highly observant nuns with photographic memories who testified about clearly indefensible police conduct. That’s why the jury system rigged against persons victimized by the police; because the only people who ever get to sit in judgment in these type of cases as jurors, are persons who have never had a bad experience with a police officer, or and who has not seen outrageous police conduct. Their life experience tells them something that’s just not true; that police officer don’t beat people up unless they did something to deserve it. You, therefore, need great proof to dispel that belief by jurors.

WHY THE COPS CAN GET USUALLY GET AWAY WITH IT; AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, WE LIVE IN A POLICE STATE

If you think, as a practical matter, that you live in a free country, you’re wrong. We live in a police state; at least to a very appreciable degree. As a practical matter, the police can do whatever they want to you, and then procure the institution of a bogus criminal case against you. They typically author bogus police reports that claim that you committed some crime, like resisting / obstructing / delaying a peace officer (Cal. Penal Code §148(a)(1)) and/or battery on a peace officer (Cal. Penal Code § 242 / 243(b)), that results in a bogus criminal prosecution against you. They know that the District Attorney’s Office takes great pride in protecting the police from civil liability, by filing and prosecuting criminal action. They do this to beat you down; to make it so expensive for you to defend yourself on bogus criminal charges that carry little chance of actually being sentenced to jail, such as resisting arrest, that you end-up taking a plea bargain, that, in practical effect, bars your lawsuit by you for either false arrest, malicious prosecution, and, in most such cases, unreasonable force.

They also do this to protect themselves from internal discipline, and criminal liability for civil rights violations (18 U.S.C. § 242; violating a persons federal Constitutional rights under the color of state law.) The employing police agency will (almost) always deny that their officer engaged in wrongful conduct, especially in swearing contest type cases, where there is no video recording of the police beatings. Because the employing police agency will (almost) always back their officers by touting their (false) version of the story in order to avoid civil liability to the employing entity for the actions of their officers, it’s almost impossible to discipline them. For example, the City of Inglewood, California, fired Inglewood Police Department officer Jeremy Morse, for the video recording beating of a teenager at a gas station. When it came time for the civil suit against the City and the officers for the beating, the City contended that the officers acted properly. Accordingly, since the City took that position, fired officer Jeremy Morse sued the city, and won $2,1600,000.00 for his wrongful firing.

FALSE ARREST CASES – DON’T CALL THE COPS UNLESS YOU WANT SOMEONE AT LEAST IN JAIL, OR VERY POSSIBLY DEAD

All of use have broken some sort of law, but most of us don’t go around holding-up liquor stores. The odds are, that if you are inquiring about a police misconduct case, such as a false arrest case, that you fall into three basic categories of ways that the police came into contact with you, and then falsely arrested you, or worse.

Former Undersheriff Paul Tanaka, along with a retired LASD Captain, were indicted on May 13, 2015 by a federal Grand Jury for Obstructing and Conspiring to Obstruct a federal Grand Jury investigation of the rampant torturing of inmates at the LA County Jail (See, Paul Tanaka Indictment of May 13, 2015.) That’s not the end of it. Former LASD Deputy Sheriff Noel Womack pleaded guilty in June of 2015 to federal charges of lying to the FBI about systemic LASD torturing and framing of inmates at the LA County Jails. In 2014, six LASD Deputy Sheriffs were convicted of obstructing the FBI’s investigation of the torturing of prisoners at the LA County Jails.

Lee Baca resigned from office over the scandal at the LA County Men’s Central Jail involving the Indictment of 18 LASD Deputy Sheriffs and their Supervisors for torturing prisoners and obstructing the FBI’s investigation of the same. On February 10, 2016, Sheriff Baca was Indicted for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2); lying to the FBI regarding his knowledge of a scheme in the Sheriff’s Department to intimidate an FBI agent who was investigating complaints of beatings of inmates by deputies at the LA County Jail, and to hide an FBI informant – jail inmate from his FBI handlers. Sheriff Baca was tried on that Indictment, but the jury hung.

Thereafter, on April 6, 2016, former LASD Undersheriff Paul Tanaka was convicted of conspiracy and actual obstruction of an FBI investigation; violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiring to obstruct justice) and 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (obstructing justice); for not only obstructing an FBI investigation into years of beatings and torturing of inmates at the L.A. County Jail, but also Tanaka and other high ranking Sheriff’s Department officials threatened one of the FBI agents involved in that investigation with arrest for continuing that investigation. In his trial, Tanaka admitted that he still had the Minnesota Vikings Logo tattoo on his leg; a tattoo that he described as a member in a club; the “Vikings”; a tatoo that the federal courts have held is the gang taoo for a “neo-Nazi white supremacists gang within the LA County Sheriff’s Department. See, Thomas v. County of LA, 978 F.2d 504 (1992).

Thereafter, on February 10, 2017, former LA County Sheriff Lee Baca was convicted of similar charges; lying to the FBI and obstruction of the FBI investigation into the systemic beatings and torture of inmates at the LA County Jail;  violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2); lying to the FBI regarding his knowledge of a scheme in the Sheriff’s Department to intimidate an FBI agent who was investigating complaints of beatings of inmates by deputies at the LA County Jail, and to hide an FBI informant – jail inmate from his FBI handlers.

I. I Called The Police To Protect Me, So Why Was I The One Who Was Beaten-Up And Arrested?

A frequent type of case in which the police falsely arrest an innocent person, is when you, your spouse, your lover, or your parent or child, call the police. Many times family members feel that they cannot control mentally ill (or mad or drunk / drugged-up) people, including and especially their relatives, so they call “911″; often believing that the ambulance and paramedics are going to come to actually help them. They may not have even thought that the police would be the responding agency, but when they find out that the police are there, trouble may be awaiting. Once the cops are on the scene, they are taught to take charge, and anyone challenging, or even questioning, the police giving orders or their authority to do so, even seemingly unreasonable ones, is going to either get physically abused by the police, or falsely arrested by the police, or both.

Also, many spouses or lovers call the police on each other, to get the other person out of the house; even for a night or two. The police are not there to solve your family problems, so when you make that call, don’t make it unless you want your spouse or lover to go to jail, or worse. Cops are not counselors. They take people to jail. That’s what they do. So remember, when you call the police on your parent, child, lover or spouse, the person who ends-up getting thumped and arrested by the police just may be you. “No” you say? The police won’t arrest me if I’m the party calling the police. You’re wrong. They don’t care who called. All that the seem to care about, is how you respond to them; regardless of how unreasonable they act. If then, they thump you and beat you up, the odds are, that the police won’t even investigate the subject matter that you called about. Now, all of their attention is on you, since they violated you.

Also, do not use the police to get a border or a family member out of your house, unless the person is posing a “real” threat of imminent serious physical harm. If it’s that bad that you can’t stay in the house, then leave and get a hotel room, or just leave. The police cannot summarily evict / eject a civilian from a home in which they reside; whether they’re on the lease or not. In California, if a person resides at a home, only a Judge can force them to leave; either in the form of: 1) a Writ of Possession (the Court Order that the landlord gets in an “unlawful detainer” action, to give to the Sheriff’s Department, to eject you from your home, when you don’t pay your rent); 2) a Civil Harassment Restraining Order (under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527.6); 3) a Domestic Violence Restraining Order (under Cal. Family Code § 6320), and 4) an Emergency Protective Order in a criminal case (pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 136.2.)

II. Contempt Of Cop Cases – A Frequent Reason For False Arrests By Police Officers.

Contempt Of Cop“ cases, are bogus criminal actions, brought against innocents by criminal prosecutors, for essentially, “bruised ego“ violations. The “ego bruising”, is really nothing more than a civilian not immediately, and without protest or question, getting-down on the ground in a proned position, or not doing something that the officer wants you to do (lawful, reasonable or not) immediately, and without question or protest. The Constable‘s “ego” is typically “bruised”, by your conduct, such as: 1) asserting your Constitutional rights, or 2) claiming knowledge of them, or 3) asking the Constable why you’re being ordered to lie down on the ground while your chest is being illuminated by the red spot of a pistol or rifle targeting device; 4) telling the Constable that you have a medical condition that makes it difficult or painful to get on the ground; 5) telling the Constable that he can’t do something (i.e. can’t go in my house without a warrant; you can’t make me go inside or come outside); 6) failing to consent to an entry or a search; and 7) not exiting your house when ordered to do so (even though the police generally can’t order you to exit a private residence; save probable cause to arrest for serious dangerous felony, coupled with an emergency; See, United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1985) and Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510 (1994.) These are but a few examples. The list is endless, but the theme is the same. Failing to immediately do whatever the police tell you to do, without protest, challenge or remarks, often will result in your being beaten-up, falsely arrested, and maliciously criminally prosecuted.

These, “Contempt Of Cop” cases, typical involve the police using force upon persons (i.e. beating them) and/or falsely arresting them, and then inventing bogus allegations of violations various “Contempt Of Cop” statutes, such as violations of: 1) Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1) (resisting / obstructing / delaying peace officer [commonly called “resisting arrest”]; the most abused statute in the Penal Code; 2) Cal. Penal Code § 240 /241(b) (assault on a peace officer); 3) Cal. Penal Code § 242 / 243(b) (battery on a peace officer); and 4) Cal. Penal Code 69 (interfering with public officer via actual or threatened use of force or violence.) Cal. Penal Code § 69 is a “wobbler“; a California public offense that may be filed by the District Attorney’s Office as either a felony or a misdemeanor. In Orange County, Riverside County and LA County, allegations of violation of Penal Code § 69 are usually filed as misdemeanors. In San Bernardino County, however, allegations of violation of Cal. Penal Code § 69 are filed as felonies much more often than her sister counties. If they shoot you, they may even charge you with Cal. Penal § Code 245(d); assault on a peace officer in a manner likely to result in great bodily injury.

III. Police Incompetence: A Frequent Reason For False Arrests By Police Officers.

Believe it or not, most experienced police officers have a pretty good functional understanding of very basic fourth amendment search and seizure issues. For example, police training about basic street contacts with civilians includes the following:

  • Detentions of persons outside of the home;
  • Arrests of persons outside of the home;
  • The use of force on persons outside of the home;
  • Probation searches
  • Parole searches
  • Search warrants
  • Warrantless searches of persons, vehicles and homes

Once you get past the basics, most police officers really don’t understand what the Constitution forbids them from doing. Police officers simply are not sufficiently trained to properly act within with long established Constitutional constraints on them. It takes years for lawyers and judges to understand fourth amendment search and seizure issues, and they disagree often about whether certain conduct is, or is not, constitutional.

Moreover, just like the rest of us, the cops make mistakes all of the time. They are human, and, therefore, false arrests by police officers are almost very often the product of either sheer incompetence (i.e. the police arrest another for conduct that isn’t criminal), or of the police officer attempting to justify his unlawful conduct, by arresting and then framing their victim (i.e. false police reports, perjurious court testimony, false convictions) of his federal criminal (18 U.S.C. § 242), and otherwise tortious misconduct (i.e. if the police use unreasonable / unlawful force on a civilian, the use of force is almost always followed by a false arrest.)

FALSE ARREST CASES; CALIFORNIA LAW

FALSE ARREST BY PEACE OFFICER – ELEMENTS AND PROOF – CALIFORNIA LAW

A “false arrest” is the same “tort” as a “false imprisonment” under California law. Unlike federal law, under California law, the burden is on the police to justify their “seizure” (false arrest / false imprisonment) of you at a civil trial (See, California Civil Jury Instructions (“CACI”) 1401 [False Arrest by Peace Officer Without Warrant] and 1402 [Peace Officer’s Justification / Defense To Claim Of False Arrest].) Under California law, a peace officer (i.e. police officer or deputy sheriff) may arrest another for a felony for which the officer has “probable cause” to believe person committed, or may arrest another for a misdemeanor that was committed in their presence (See, Cal. Penal Code § 836.) “Presence is not mere physical proximity but is determined by whether the offense is apparent to the officers senses. People v. Sjosten, 262 Cal.App.2d 539, 543544 (1968″.) An officer can arrest a civilian, upon probable cause, for any felony; committed in the presence of an officer or not. Cal. Penal Code § 836. However, it does not violate the fourth amendment, for an officer to arrest for a misdemeanor that was committed outside of the presence of the officer.

FALSE ARREST BY PEACE OFFICER – NO “QUASI-QUALIFIED IMMUNITY” – CALIFORNIA LAW

Cal. Penal Code 847(b) provides:

“There shall be no civil liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall arise against, any peace officer . . . acting within the scope of his or her authority, for false arrest or false imprisonment arising out of any arrest under any of the following circumstances:

(1) The arrest was lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful.”

Although police civil defendants have argued that Section 847(b)(1) immunizes peace officers for false arrests like the “qualified immunity“ provided for police false arrest civil defendants federal court, that code section cannot be reasonably construed that way. The first part of Section 47(b)(1)(“The arrest was lawful”), logically changes nothing, for if the arrest was lawful, then there is no liability under anyone’s theory; kind an unintended legal redundancy. The second part of Section 47(b)(1) (“the peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful”), could only reasonably be meant to apply to a situation, where an officer arrested a civilian based upon either: 1) an arrest warrant that did issue, but for which there was no probable cause to have issued (the officer who obtained the arrest warrant on insufficient grounds committed the fourth amendment violation, and is liable for the false arrest, unless otherwise protected, such as by “qualified immunity“), or 2) when the officer had “reasonable cause, which is essentially a term equivalent to “probable cause” under the jury instructions that are used at the trial of this particular tort (See, CACI 1402; . . . arrest lawful if . . . “reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiff committed a crime is the standard for whether a peace officer’s arrest of a civilian was lawful.) Therefore, logically, Section 47(b)(1) provides no immunity for California peace officers for a false arrest. That does not mean, however, that a state or federal judge won’t disagree with that proposition. It is not fully developed under either California law, or by the federal district court’s interpretation of that statute.

FALSE ARREST BY PEACE OFFICER – FEDERAL LAW – GENERALLY

A “false arrest” under federal law, is considered a violation of a person’s right to be free from an “unreasonable seizure” of their person under the Fourth Amendment (See, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Model Civil Jury Instruction for Arrest Without Probable Cause Or Warrant.) The United States Supreme Court has defined a “seizure of a person” as when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave the presence of police officers and to go about their business. See, United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980.)

In 1871, Congress enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983), that gives any person whose federal Constitutional rights have been violated, a right to sue, any person who violated those rights under the color of state law, in a United States District Court. Section 1983 lawsuits can also be brought in a state court of general jurisdiction; See, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Accordingly, a person who is falsely arrested by a peace officer (i.e. police officer, deputy sheriff, or some other officer who derives peace officer powers from state law), may sue the police officer under Section 1983, as well as under California state law.

In federal court, in a civil Fourth Amendment “arrest without probable cause” case (a federal false arrest case), the jury is instructed at the end of the case, on the following definition of “probable cause”:

“Probable cause exists when, under all of the circumstances known to the officer[s] at the time, an objectively reasonable police officer would conclude there is a fair probability that the plaintiff has committed or was committing a crime” (See, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Model Civil Jury Instruction 9.20, Arrest Without Probable Cause Or Warrant.)

Therefore, that standard, whether “an objectively reasonable police officer would conclude there is a “fair probability” that the plaintiff has committed or was committing a crime”, is the standard that the propriety of an arrest, outside of the home is judged by, in federal court in the states comprising the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instruction 9.20). It doesn’t matter what the thousands of other cases, from the Supreme Court on down, say about what “probable cause” means. All that matters, is what a civil jury is going to be told is the standard that they should judge the facts by, in their deliberations (a civil jury is the “Judge of the facts” [“trier of fact”], and the District Judge is the “Judge of the law”.)

Some justices say that the words “probable cause, are found in the text of the fourth amendment itself, and that is the standard for a seizure of a person by the government that was established by the Founding Fathers at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1791; not reasonable suspicion:

“MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.

I agree that petitioner was “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. I also agree that frisking petitioner and his companions for guns was a “search.” But it is a mystery how that “search” and that “seizure” can be constitutional by Fourth Amendment standards unless there was “probable cause” [n1] to believe that (1) a crime had been committed or (2) a crime was in the process of being committed or (3) a crime was about to be committed.

The opinion of the Court disclaims the existence of “probable cause.” If loitering were in issue and that [p36] was the offense charged, there would be “probable cause” shown. But the crime here is carrying concealed weapons; [n2] and there is no basis for concluding that the officer had “probable cause” for believing that that crime was being committed. Had a warrant been sought, a magistrate would, therefore, have been unauthorized to issue one, for he can act only if there is a showing of “probable cause.” We hold today that the police have greater authority to make a “seizure” and conduct a “search” than a judge has to authorize such action. We have said precisely the opposite over and over again. [n3] [p37].”

In other words, police officers up to today have been permitted to effect arrests or searches without warrants only when the facts within their personal knowledge would satisfy the constitutional standard of probable cause. At the time of their “seizure” without a warrant, they must possess facts concerning the person arrested that would have satisfied a magistrate that “probable cause” was indeed present. The term “probable cause” rings a bell of certainty that is not sounded by phrases such as “reasonable suspicion.” Moreover, the meaning of “probable cause” is deeply imbedded in our constitutional history. As we stated in Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-102:

“The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history. The general warrant, in which the name of the person to be arrested was left blank, and the writs of assistance, against which James Otis inveighed, both perpetuated the oppressive practice of allowing the police to arrest and search on suspicion. Police control took the place of judicial control, since no showing of “probable cause” before a magistrate was required.

That philosophy [rebelling against these practices] later was reflected in the Fourth Amendment. And as the early American decisions both before and immediately after its adoption show, common rumor or report, suspicion, or even “strong reason to suspect” was not adequate to support a warrant [p38] for arrest. And that principle has survived to this day. . . .

. . . It is important, we think, that this requirement [of probable cause] be strictly enforced, for the standard set by the Constitution protects both the officer and the citizen. If the officer acts with probable cause, he is protected even though it turns out that the citizen is innocent. . . . And while a search without a warrant is, within limits, permissible if incident to a lawful arrest, if an arrest without a warrant is to support an incidental search, it must be made with probable cause. . . . This immunity of officers cannot fairly be enlarged without jeopardizing the privacy or security of the citizen.

The infringement on personal liberty of any “seizure” of a person can only be “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment if we require the police to possess “probable cause” before they seize him. Only that line draws a meaningful distinction between an officer’s mere inkling and the presence of facts within the officer’s personal knowledge which would convince a reasonable man that the person seized has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a particular crime.

In dealing with probable cause, . . . as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175.

To give the police greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path. Perhaps such a step is desirable to cope with modern forms of lawlessness. But if it is taken, it should be the deliberate choice of the people through a constitutional amendment. [p39] Until the Fourth Amendment, which is closely allied with the Fifth, [n4] is rewritten, the person and the effects of the individual are beyond the reach of all government agencies until there are reasonable grounds to believe (probable cause) that a criminal venture has been launched or is about to be launched.

There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today.

Yet if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police can pick him up whenever they do not like the cut of his jib, if they can “seize” and “search” him in their discretion, we enter a new regime. The decision to enter it should be made only after a full debate by the people of this country.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) Douglas,J. Dissenting.

Moreover, it does not matter what the arresting officer’s state of mind was, even if he was mistaken as to the crime committed, so long as in retrospect, a reasonably well trained officer would have believed that there was a “fair probability” that you committed a crime.

The Closely Related Offense Doctrine; A Reasonable But Now Extinct Approach To Whether Civil Liability Attaches To An Arrest.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used to employ a doctrine entitled the “Closely Related Offense Doctrine.” Under that doctrine, if an officer arrested a civilian for one particular crime, but the police officer didn’t have probable cause to have arrested the person was for that crime, if a reasonably well trained officer would have believed that probable cause existed to have arrested the person for some other crime that was “closely related” to the crime that the person was arrested for, then the arrest is valid under the “Closely Related Offense Doctrine.” Bingham v City of Manhattan Beach, 341 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2003.) However, the “Closely Related Offense Doctrine” was overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004.)

“Our cases make clear that an arresting officers state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause. . . . That is to say, his subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause. As we have repeatedly explained, the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action. . .. [T]he Fourth Amendments concern with reasonableness allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.” See, Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 15253 (2004.)

Accordingly, the arresting police officers belief about what crime a person committed is irrelevant. All that matters is whether a reasonably well trained officer would have entertained a belief that the person arrested committed a crime; that is, the “reasonably well trained officer” in the abstract. If that fictional “reasonably well trained police officer” would not have believed that a crime had been committed, the arrested person may be able to obtain compensation for his/her false arrest.

Many times an officer mistakenly believes that certain conduct is a crime, but it’s not (See, Tab above for “Police Misconduct News, and the Section therein entitled “Possum Impossible”; the Lorenzo Oliver case; Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals holds that, as matter of law, no crime committed.) Other times, an officer arrests a person for a crime that he has no warrant or probable cause for, but, under the facts as the officer knew them, there was nonetheless a crime committed, that would have been apparent to the officer is he was familiar with that particular criminal statute. So long as a reasonably well trained officer would have believed that probable cause existed from the facts known to the arresting officer, the arrest is generally lawful. See, Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 15253 (2004.)

Atwater Legalizes Otherwise False Arrests.

If a police officer arrests you for any violation of law, even a parking ticket or a seat-belt violation, actually taking you to jail and booking you does not violate the Fourth Amendment; at least since 2001. See, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (arrest for violation of Texas seat-belt statute that carries a maximum $50.00 fine and no jail, not violative of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures”.)(See also, however, stinging Dissent by Justice O’Connor in Atwater:

“Such unbounded discretion [to arrest for even the most trivial offense] carries with it grave potential for abuse. The majority takes comfort in the lack of evidence of an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests. Ante, at 33, and n. 25. But the relatively small number of published cases dealing with such arrests proves little and should provide little solace. Indeed, as the recent debate over racial profiling demonstrates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic infraction may often serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing an individual. After today, the arsenal available to any officer extends to a full arrest and the searches permissible concomitant to that arrest. An officers subjective motivations for making a traffic stop are not relevant considerations in determining the reasonableness of the stop. See, Whren v. United States, supra, at 813. But it is precisely because these motivations are beyond our purview that we must vigilantly ensure that officers post stop actions which are properly within our reach comport with the Fourth Amendments guarantee of reasonableness . . . . The Court neglects the Fourth Amendments express command in the name of administrative ease. In so doing, it cloaks the pointless indignity that Gail Atwater suffered with the mantle of reasonableness. I respectfully dissent.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) O’Connor, J., Dissenting.

FALSE ARREST BY PEACE OFFICER – FEDERAL LAW – QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Under the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, so long as a reasonably well trained officer could have believed that a person’s conduct constituted a crime, the officer who actually violated the Constitutional rights of another is nonetheless immune from being liable for damages caused by the officer’s Constitutional violation:

“The qualified immunity analysis involves two separate steps. First, the court determines whether the facts show the officers conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the alleged conduct did not violate a constitutional right, then the defendants are entitled to immunity and the claim must be dismissed. However, if the alleged conduct did violate such a right, then the court must determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged unlawful action. Id. A right is clearly established if a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Id. at 202. If the right is not clearly established, then the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. While the order in which these questions are addressed is left to the courts sound discretion, it is often beneficial to perform the analysis in the sequence outlined above. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818 (2009). Of course, where a claim of qualified immunity is to be denied, both questions must be answered.” Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2009.)

These days, qualified immunity for false arrests are so common, that they almost make false arrest cases impossible to win.

WHAT YOU CAN DO

Someone has to stand-up to the bullies of society, who think that using state police power to humiliate others, is funny, and makes them big men (or women.) There are thousands of others like you, who are good people, and have been somehow, for some reason that you could not have ever imagined, victimized by the government. It might as well be you. Stand-up for justice. Stand-up for our form of self-government. Stand-up for the spilled-blood of our fathers, who bravery died to prevent the very thing, that the government is doing to you right now.

Click on “Home”, above, or the other pages shown, for the information or assistance that we can provide for you. If you need to speak with a lawyer about your particular legal situation, please call the Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering for a free telephone consultation. Also, if you have been the victim of a False Arrest or Excessive Force by a police officer, check our Section, above, entitled: What To Do If You Have Been Beaten-Up Or False Arrested By The Police“.

Thank you, and best of luck, whatever your needs.

Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering

Jerry L. Steering, Esq.

Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering, 4063 Birch Street, Suite 100, Newport Beach, CA 92660; (949) 474-1849; Fax: (949) 474-1883; email: jerrysteering@yahoo.com

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Anaheim Civil Rights and Police Misconduct Lawyer

Jerry L. Steering, Esq., is a Police Misconduct Attorney, who has been suing police officers since 1984, for, among other things, false arrests and malicious prosecutions, and the use of excessive force upon civilians. His law practice involves serving, among other places, Anaheim. Mr. Steering also represents persons in both civil and criminal cases in Anaheim. He is an expert in police brutality / excessive force and false arrest cases; both civil and criminal. Mr. Steering has successfully defended bogus criminal actions (i.e. resisting arrest; battery on peace officer; over 90% of which are frame-ups) and has successfully sued Anaheim police, for many years now. Here are a few examples:

NOTABLE ANAHEIM NOTABLE POLICE MISCONDUCT CASES

Jerry L. Steering Obtains $2,900,000.00 for Anaheim Police Shooting of Motorist During Wild Wild West Vehicle Pursuit.

This was one of the craziest vehicle pursuits in modern history, with the Anaheim Police Shooting at Eliuth Nava Penaloza basically taking the police on a ride around his neighborhood. They shots 76 bullets at him, and, at the neighbors.

Oliver v. City of Anaheim, U.S. District Court; Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 2012; (plaintiff won case in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on their unlawful arrest claim; false arrest as matter of law.) Plaintiffs obtained $400,000.00 for four hour false arrest of father (and son), for father telling police that he didn’t know of his son hit a opossum with a shovel (which isn’t a crime anyway), so the Anaheim Police Officers busted the father for violation of Cal. Penal Code § 32 (i.e. “accessory to crime”, for not  incriminating his son, for something that isn’t a crime.) See, CBS News 10/16/12; “Possum Impossible“.)   Mr. Steering has also had many acquittals in OC Superior Court; especially in cases involving false arrests.

PUBLICATIONS

Mr. Steering is also a published legal scholar, and has a published Law Review Article a logical quandary of federal evidentiary law: the disparity in the use of “accomplice accusations“ between Fourth Amendment (accomplice accusations sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause for search warrant), and Sixth Amendment analysis (accomplice accusations are so inherently unreliable, that Congress could not have meant to have included them with the ambit of the Declaration Against Penal Interest exception to the hearsay rule.) As explained in the Law Review Article, a statement is either made under circumstances that we believe indicate that they are reliable, or not. Although the tests may be somewhat different, the statement is either reliable or not, and treating the statement as unreliable for Sixth Amendment purposes, but as reliable for Fourth Amendment purposes, is simply illogical. See, “The Application Of Sixth Amendment Tests For The Reliability Of Hearsay Evidence To Probable Cause Determinations”, 16 Rutgers Law Journal 869 (1985.)

Mr. Steering has been suing police officers, and defending bogus criminal cases of crimes against police officers, since 1984. The majority ofthe Steering lawfirm’s practice, is suing police officers and other government officials, for misconduct, such as false arrest, police brutality / excessive force, malicious prosecution, and other “Constitutional Torts.”   Unfortunately, because of institutional pressures (i.e. “ratting out fellow officer not good career move), and the obvious political and practical consequences of not backing-up the their fellow officers, the norm in todays police profession, is for peace officers to falsely arrest, and procure the bogus criminal prosecution (i.e. to literally “frame”) of those civilians, whose Constitutional rights and basic human dignity have been violated.

If you have been the victim of Excessive Force or a False Arrest by a police officer, please check our Section, above, entitled: “What To Do If You Have Been Beaten-Up Or False Arrested By The Police“. Also, please click on “Home“, above, or the other pages shown, for the information or assistance that we can provide for you. If you nhttps://steeringlaw.com/what-to-do-if-you-have-been-beaten-up-or-falsely-arrested-by-the-police/eed to speak with a lawyer about your particular legal situation, please call the Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering for a free consultation. Jerry L. Steering, Esq., is a Civil Rights – Police Misconduct Attorney, serving, among other places, OC, and the OC cities shown below,  Mr. Steering has been suing police officers for civil rights violations, and defending bogus criminal cases of crimes against police officers, for almost 29 years. The majority of the Steering law firm’s practice, is suing police officers and other government officials, for misconduct, such as false arrest, police brutality / excessive force, malicious prosecution, and other “Constitutional Torts“.   Click on “Home“, above, or the other pages shown, for the information or assistance that we can provide for you. If you need to speak with a lawyer about your particular legal situation, please call the Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering for a free telephone consultation.

Thank you, and best of luck, whatever your needs.

Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering

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Civil Rights Attorney

Jerry L. Steering, Esq. before 9th Cir. Court of Appeals, Pasadena, CA

CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE RISE OF THE POLICE STATE:

AS A PRACTICAL MATTER,

George Orwell, author of the book “1984” about “Big Brother” and the police state of the future

WE LIVE IN A QUASI-POLICE STATE.

If you think, as a practical matter, that you live in a “free country”, you’re wrong. We don’t. We live in a quasi-police state; at least to a very appreciable degree; too appreciable. The National Security Agency spies on all Americans. They record all of our phone calls (cell or landline), our faxes, our emails, every key stroke of any online activities, and so much more. When these facts became public in the Spring of 2013, many people grumbled, but the grumbling only lasted for a few weeks. The unconstitutionality, and criminality of these actions of our “Big Brother“ (the National Security Agency) at least the last few Presidential administrations is apparent. These “interceptions” constitute a search, that, pass muster under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, must be obtained pursuant to a search warrant; supported by probable cause. That means that the government must already have sufficient evidence that you are engaged in criminal activity before they get their permission to intercept your communications. Under the guise of making us safe, the government has, and is, trampling the very pillars of liberty that millions have been wounded and have died to protect. In this respect, the terrorists have already won. They have made us more like them. They have caused us to abandon those principles of a free society, and has turned us into a police state. Do you feel safer knowing that there are secret courts, with secret judges, secret proceedings, that no one can check, examine or challenge?

The Police State isn’t the police; its the public acceptance of restrictions on the liberty of our fellow citizens by juries who judge police conduct

The Police State; The Police Use The Courts To Trample Your Liberty, Because They Can.

We also are now in a “police state”, because, as a practical matter, the police can do just about whatever they want to you, and then procure the institution of a bogus criminal case against you, to protect themselves.  They typically author bogus police reports that claim that you committed some crime, like resisting / obstructing / delaying a peace officer and/or battery on a peace officer, that result in a bogus criminal prosecution against you. Most of the time, they twist things around (i.e. the suspect struck my fist with his jaw.) There are a base collection of police report buzz words, that cops use to tickle the ambitious fantasies of young Deputy District Attorneys, who want to make a mark for themselves in the District Attorney’s Office, by persecuting the innocent, the actual victim, to protect the government from civil liability and obloquy. Some of these key terms are: 1) the suspect took an aggressive stance (or a fighting stance); 2) believing the suspect was going to strike me, I applied a departmental approved control hold, which the suspect, with his great strength, pulled out of; 3) I shot the suspect several times with my department issued taser, but it had no effect on the him; 4) I sprayed the suspect several times with my department issued pepper-spray, but it had no effect on the him; 5) I assisted the suspect to the ground by gently pushing the back of his knee with mine; 6) I tried to grab the suspect, but he pulled away from my grasp, and we both ended-up going to the ground, with me somehow landing on top of him; 7) I pointed my pistol directly at the suspect’s head and ordered him to show me his hands, but he refused to do so, and kept his hands in his waistband area, so I shot him (for LASD, 100%; (15) unarmed people were killed by LASD in 2010 with the waistband excuse); 8) I asked the suspect his name, and he said “fuck you motherfucker”; 9) the suspect continued to fight us (while we were both on-top of his back, holding both of his arms, with the suspect face down; some “fight”.) They go on and on.

Inglewood Police Department Officer Jeremy Morse

The police know that the District Attorney’s Office takes great pride in protecting the police from civil liability,by filing and prosecuting criminal action. They do this to beat you down; to make it so expensive for you to defend yourself on bogus criminal charges, such as resisting arrest, that you take a plea bargain, and, in effect, bar a lawsuit by you for either false arrest, malicious prosecution, and, in most such cases, unreasonable force. They also do this to protect themselves from internal discipline and criminal liability for civil rights violations (18 U.S.C.§ 242.) The employing police agency will (almost) always deny that their officer engaged in wrongful conduct, especially in swearing contest type cases, where there is no video recording of the police beatings. Because the employing police agency will (almost) always back their officers by touting their (false) version of the story in order to avoid civil liability to the employing entity for the actions of their officers, it’s almost impossible to discipline them. For example, the City of Inglewood, California, fired Inglewood Police Department officer Jeremy Morse, for the video recording beating of a teenager at a gas station. When it came time for the civil suit against the City and the officers for the beating, the City contended that the officers acted properly. Accordingly, since the City took that position, fired officer Jeremy Morse sued the city, and won $1,600,000.00 for his wrongful firing.

 

In 2010 the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department shot to death 15 people, who they claimed were reaching for their waistband; notwithstanding that none of the shooting victims were armed. No one was prosecuted or disciplined. Who needs a hunting license? Join the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, and you can shoot who ever you want to (unless the shooting is video recorded. If it is, the politicians may have to get rid of the officer.) Recently (forced to retire) LASD Undersheriff, Paul Tanaka, was a member of the Vikings; a White supremacist Neo-Nazi organization within the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. See, Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1992.)

That’s not the end of it. Former LASD Deputy Sheriff Noel Womack pleaded guilty in June of 2015 to federal charges of lying to the FBI about systemic LASD torturing and framing of inmates at the Los Angeles County Jails. In 2014, six LASD Deputy Sheriffs were convicted of obstructing the FBI’s investigation of the torturing of prisoners at the Los Angeles County Jails.

LASD Undersheriff Paul Tanaka following his conviction for obstruction of federal investigation

Former Undersheriff Paul Tanaka, along with a retired LASD Captain, were indicted on May 13, 2015 by a federal Grand Jury for Obstructing and Conspiring to Obstruct a federal Grand Jury investigation of the rampant torturing of inmates at the Los Angeles County Jail (See, Paul Tanaka Indictment of May 13, 2015.) That’s not the end of it. Former LASD Deputy Sheriff Noel Womack pleaded guilty in June of 2015 to federal charges of lying to the FBI about systemic LASD torturing and framing of inmates at the Los Angeles County Jails. In 2014, six LASD Deputy Sheriffs were convicted of obstructing the FBI’s investigation of the torturing of prisoners at the Los Angeles County Jails.

Lee Baca resigned from office over the scandal at the LA County Men’s Central Jail involving the Indictment of 18 LASD Deputy Sheriffs and their Supervisors for torturing prisoners and obstructing the FBI’s investigation of the same. On February 10, 2016, Sheriff Baca was Indicted for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2); lying to the FBI regarding his knowledge of a scheme in the Sheriff’s Department to intimidate an FBI agent who was investigating complaints of beatings of inmates by deputies at the Los Angeles County Jail, and to hide an FBI informant – jail inmate from his FBI handlers. Sheriff Baca was tried on that Indictment, but the jury hung.

Thereafter, on April 6, 2016, former LASD Undersheriff Paul Tanaka was convicted of conspiracy and actual obstruction of an FBI investigation; violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiring to obstruct justice) and 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (obstructing justice); for not only obstructing an FBI investigation into years of beatings and torturing of inmates at the L.A. County Jail, but also Tanaka and other high ranking Sheriff’s Department officials threatened one of the FBI agents involved in that investigation with arrest for continuing that investigation. In his trial, Tanaka admitted that he still had the Minnesota Vikings Logo tattoo on his leg; a tattoo that he described as a member in a club; the “Vikings”; a tatoo that the federal courts have held is the gang taoo for a “neo-Nazi white supremacists gang within the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. See, Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504 (1992).

Lee Baca following his conviction for obstructing the FBI’s investigation of deputy beatings at the Los Angeles County jails.

Thereafter, on February 10, 2017, former Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca was convicted of similar charges; lying to the FBI and obstruction of the FBI investigation into the systemic beatings and torture of inmates at the Los Angeles County Jail;  violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2); lying to the FBI regarding his knowledge of a scheme in the Sheriff’s Department to intimidate an FBI agent who was investigating complaints of beatings of inmates by deputies at the Los Angeles County Jail, and to hide an FBI informant – jail inmate from his FBI handlers.

It should be noted that this article is not a condemnation of District Attorneys who don’t bring criminal charges against peace officers who commit homicides in the course of their official police duties. The author understands that it is extremely difficult to criminally convict California peace officers for duty related actions, such as shooting another, and that those District Attorney’s may not feel that a criminal prosecution would actually be successful; notwithstanding any personal belief of the criminality of those actions by the District Attorneys of California.

THE RISE OF THE POLICE STATE; CONTEMPT OF COP CASES – “OBSTRUCTION CRIME ARRESTS”.

Perhaps the greatest threat to the right to be left alone by the government, is the abuse of certain criminal statutes to stifle verbal challenge or protest of police actions and statements. In the real world, if you “fail the attitude test“, you’re just committed “Contempt of Cop“; a phrase that unfortunately represents the trigger for most arrests of innocents for certain crimes against peace officers. Contempt Of Cop cases, are bogus criminal actions, brought against innocents by criminal prosecutors, for essentially, bruised ego violations. The “ego bruising”, is really nothing more than a civilian not immediately, and without protest or question, getting-down on the ground in a proned position, or not doing something that the officer wants you to do (lawful, reasonable or not) immediately, and without question or protest. The Constable‘s “ego” is typically “bruised”, by your conduct, such as: 1) asserting your Constitutional rights, or 2) claiming knowledge of them, or 3) asking the Constable why you’re being ordered to lie down on the ground while your chest is being illuminated by the red spot of a pistol or rifle targeting device; 4) telling the Constable that you have a medical condition that makes it difficult or painful to get on the ground; 5) telling the Constable that he can’t do something (i.e. can’t go in my house without a warrant; you can’t make me go inside or come outside); 6) failing to consent to an entry or a search; and 7) not exiting your house when ordered to do so (even though the police generally can’t order you to exit a private residence; save probable cause to arrest for serious dangerous felony, coupled with an emergency; See, United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1985) and Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510 (1994.)) These are but a few examples. The list is endless, but the theme is the same. Failing to immediately do whatever the police tell you to do, without protest, disapproval, challenge or remarks, often will result in your being beaten-up, falsely arrested, and maliciously criminally prosecuted.

These, “Contempt Of Cop“ cases also typically involve the police using force upon persons (i.e. beating them) and/or falsely arresting them, and then inventing bogus allegations of violations various “Contempt Of Cop“ statutes, such as violations of: 1) Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1) (resisting / obstructing / delaying peace officer [commonly called “resisting arrest”]; the most abused statute in the Penal Code; 2) Cal. Penal Code  § 240/241(b) (assault on a peace officer); 3) Cal. Penal Code § 242 / 243(b) (battery on a peace officer); and 4) Cal. Penal Code § 69 (interfering with public officer via actual or threatened use of force or violence.) Cal. Penal Code § 69 is a “wobbler”; a California public offense that may be filed by the District Attorney’s Office as either a felony or a misdemeanor. In Orange County, Riverside County and Los Angeles County, allegations of violation of Penal Code § 69 are usually filed as misdemeanors. In San Bernardino County, however, allegations of violation of Cal. Penal Code § 69 are filed as felonies much more often than her sister counties. If they shoot you, they may even charge you with Cal. Penal § Code 245(d); assault on a peace officer in a manner likely to result in great bodily injury.

Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1) (resisting / obstructing / delaying peace officer) is the most abused statute in the Penal Code, because of it’s inherent ambiguity. It is so vague, that almost any interaction, or failure to interact, with the police,can be “tailored” to apply to non-criminal conduct. What exactly does it mean to “resist” or to “obstruct” or to “delay” a peace officer in the lawful performance of their duties? No one knows. There is no meaning. It means everything, and it means nothing.

Mr. Steering is an expert in “Contempt Of Cop” type cases, and has litigated, consulted, advised or has otherwise been involved in thousands of these type of bogus criminal cases; usually for fabricated charges of either: 1) resisting / obstructing / delaying a peace officer in the lawful performance of his duties, 2) assault and battery on a peace officer, 3) using / threatening use of force or violence to deter or prevent a public officer from performing their duty, 4) assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer, or, 5) attempted murder of a peace officer.

Unfortunately, the natural American reaction to hearing that you are accused of a crime, is to presume that you actually committed some crime, or otherwise acted unlawfully, anti-socially dishonorably or despicably. These, “Contempt Of Cop“ cases, typical involve the police using force upon persons (i.e. beating them) and/or falsely arresting them, and then inventing bogus allegations of violations various “Contempt Of Cop” statutes, such as violations of: 1) Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1) (resisting / obstructing / delaying peace officer; the most abused statute in the Penal Code; 2) Cal. Penal Code § 240/241(b) (assault on a peace officer); 3) Cal. Penal Code § 242 / 243(b) (battery on a peace officer); and 4) Cal. Penal Code § 69 (interfering with public officer via actual or threatened use of force or violence.) Cal. Penal Code § 69 is a “wobbler”; a California public offense that may be filed by the District Attorney’s Office as either a felony or a misdemeanor. In Orange County, Riverside County and Los Angeles County, allegations of violation of Penal Code § 69 are usually filed as misdemeanors. In San Bernardino County, however, allegations of violation of Cal. Penal Code § 69 are filed as felonies much more often than her sister counties.

THE RISE OF THE POLICE STATE; THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE “EXCLUSIONARY RULE.”

THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF THE VERY TOOL FASHIONED BY THE SUPREME COURT, TO PREVENT POLICE MISCONDUCT; THE REAL WORLD CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

WHAT IS THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE?

The “Exclusionary Rule” prevents the government from using most evidence in criminal cases that was obtained in violation of the United States Constitution. It applies to evidence gained from an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), to improperly elicited self-incriminatory statements gathered in violation of the Fifth Amendment, See, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 439 (1966), and to evidence gained in situations where the government violated defendants Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, See, Miranda. The rule does not apply to civil cases, including deportation hearings. See, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984.)

If evidence that falls within the scope of the exclusionary rule led law enforcement to other evidence, which they would not otherwise have located, then the exclusionary rule applies to the related evidence found subsequent to the excluded evidence as well. Such subsequent evidence has taken on the name of fruit of the poisonous tree.

The Exclusionary Rule is a court-created remedy and deterrent, not an independent constitutional right. Courts will not apply the rule to exclude illegally gathered evidence where the costs of exclusion outweigh its deterrent or remedial benefits. Thus, the rule is not triggered when courthouse errors lead police officers to mistakenly believe that they have a valid search warrant, because excluding the evidence would not deter police officers from violating the law in the future. See, Arizona v. Evans, 541 U.S. 1 (1995.)

WHY DID THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DISMANTLE MANY CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS?

People who believe the Courts are a bunch of judges who let the criminals go free for the slightest technicality, have no concept of reality. In fact, most people don’t have a clue as to what Constitutional rights they have, or, in many situations, what Constitutional rights they used to have. For example, most people believe that when the police arrest you, that they are somehow obligated to read you your Miranda warnings. They aren’t, and they usually don’t.; especially when the witnessed or participated in the event that they are calling a crime. All that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) stands for, is the proposition that after you’re in police custody (i.e. arrested), that any statement that you make to the police in response to custodial police interrogation, cannot be introduced into evidence against you at your criminal trial, unless you were first advised of your right to counsel (under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution) and your right against self-incrimination (under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.) However, if you take the witness stand and testify at your criminal trial, statements made by you that were obtained in violation of Miranda can then be introduced against you, because the exclusionary rule is not a license to lie

In Federal and in California criminal cases (and, in reality, every other appellate court in the United States), the Appellate Courts very often distort and pervert the contours the protections provided to us in the United States Constitution, by simply stating that the Constitution doesn’t prohibit a particular form of government conduct. They do this so they don’t have to exclude evidence in a criminal trial; evidence that will often prove the defendant’s guilt, and without which, the government had no case. This, unfortunately, is the unintended consequence of the exclusionary rule; the rule created by the United States Supreme Court, to curb unlawful police conduct that results in the police illegally obtaining evidence, in Weeks v. United States 245 U.S. 618 (1918) (exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in federal court criminal trials) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in state court criminal trials.)

When Judges are faced with a choice of either excluding incriminating evidence at criminal trial because it was obtained in violation of the Federal Constitution, or simply re-characterizing and deliberately misinterpreting what the contours of those protections are, many many times, the Courts will choose perverting our Constitutional protections. In other words, Appellate Court Judges often “change” (by judicial fiat)the protections of the Constitutional provision at issue, to let the evidence in. Although this may be just wonderful for convicting the guilty, the consequences of reducing the protections afforded to all persons under a particular Constitutional provision undermines the liberty interests of the rest of us innocent people:

Champion of Liberty; Felix Frankfurter; Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court 1939 – 1962

“By the Bill of Rights the founders of this country subordinated police action to legal restraints, not in order to convenience the guilty but to protect the innocent. Nor did they provide that only the innocent may appeal to these safeguards. They knew too well that the successful prosecution of the guilty does not require jeopardy to the innocent. The knock at the door under the guise of a warrant of arrest for a venial or spurious offense was not unknown to them. Compare the statement in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390, 34 S.Ct. 341, 343, that searches and seizures had been made under general warrants in England ‘in support of charges, real or imaginary.’ We have had grim reminders in our day of their experience. Arrest under a warrant for a minor or a trumped-up charge has been familiar practice in the past, is a commonplace in the police state of today, and too well-known in this country. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888.

The progress is too easy from police action unscrutinized by judicial authorization to the police state. The founders wrote into the Constitution their conviction that law enforcement does not require the easy but dangerous way of letting the police determine when search is called for without prior authorization by a magistrate. They have been vindicated in that conviction. It may safely be asserted that crime is most effectively brought to book when the principles underlying the constitutional restraints upon police action are most scrupulously observed.” United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950);Frankfurter, J.

YOUR REMEDIES FOR CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION BY POLICE OFFICERS.

Modern Day KKK Members

The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 42 U.S.C.  § 1983.

The federal statute that persons in the United States use every day to sue police officers and other persons acting under the color of     law, is “The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871″; 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 Actions”, Are The Premier And Most Commonly Use Remedy, To Obtain Redress for Constitutional Violations, By Persons Acting Under The Color Of State Law.

In the years after the Civil War, the South began to see the emergence of white terrorist groups. These organizations of composed mostly of veterans still aspring to the goals of the Confederacy and their own Southern heritage, brought terror to freed blacks who looked to participate in the community as well as to their white allies. The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 was Congress’ attempt to put an end to the policies of terrorism, intimidation, and violence that the Klan, the Knights of the White Camelia, and the Jayhawkers had been using. The law unfortunately failed to eradicate the Klan or abolish the continued use of fear tactics and brutality against blacks and supportive whites.

Founded as a fraternal organization by Confederate veterans in Pulaski, Tennessee, in 1866, the Ku Klux Klan soon became a paramilitary group devoted to the overthrow of Republican governments in the South and the reassertion of white supremacy. Through murder, kidnapping, and violent intimidation, Klansmen sought to secure Democratic victories in elections by attacking black voters and, less frequently, white Republican leaders.

In response to Klan violence, Congress passed the first of three Enforcement Acts on May 31, 1870, to ensure that the provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were followed. The act, which made it a federal offensive to try to deprive anyone of his civil rights, had little effect on the deteriorating situation. A second Enforcement Act, passed on February 28, 1871, established federal supervision over elections, but also did little to remedy the situation. After the failure in the House of a more powerful bill that would have given the federal government additional power to enforce election law, President Grant decided to intervene. The President met with Congressional leaders to urge the passage of stronger legislation, and on their recommendation, Grant issued a direct appeal to Congress requesting a new law. Grant’s appeal was successful, and Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act.

Ulysses S. Grant, Savior of the Republic and the 18th President of the United States

On April 20, 1871, Congress Passed The Ku Klux Klan Act; 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Also known as the third Enforcement Act. the bill was a controversial expansion of federal authority, designed to give the federal government additional power to protect voters. The act established penalties in the form of fines and jail time for attempts to deprive citizens of equal protection under the laws and gave the President the authority to use federal troops and suspend the writ of habeas corpus in ensuring that civil rights were upheld.

President Grant put the new legislation to work after several Klan incidents in May.

He sent additional troops to the South and suspended the writ of habeas corpus in nine counties in South Carolina. Aided by Attorney General Amos T. Akermen and the newly created Department of Justice, extensive work was done to prosecute the Klan. While relatively few convictions were obtained, the new legislation helped to suppress Klan activities and ensure a greater degree of fairness in the election of 1872.

In 1871, Congress enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983), that gives any person whose federal Constitutional rights have been violated, a right to sue, any person who violated those rights under the color of state law, in a United States District Court. Section 1983 lawsuits can also be brought in a state court of general jurisdiction; See, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, a person who is falsely arrested by a peace officer (i.e. police officer, deputy sheriff, or some other officer who derives peace officer powers from state law), may sue the police officer under Section 1983, as well as under California state law. Similarly, one who is subjected to unreasonable force, a malicious criminal prosecution, or other Constitution violation, may sue in a federal or state court for redress under Section 1983.

Commonly referred to as “Section 1983″ cases or actions, this federal statute was enacted by Congress in response to a letter from President Ulysses S. Grant; complaining of the conditions in the Southern states, and asking Congress to create a remedy for persons of African descent (i.e. former slaves), for violation of their federal Constitutional rights, by persons acting under the color of state law; the Sheriff and his posse. That’s what the KKK did. The local Sheriff and his posse, deputized and KKK members, would murder former slaves, but their widows and children had no actual remedy in Southern state courts; no remedy that either a Court would allow to proceed, or if so allowed, that a Southern white Post Civil War jury, would award compensation for. Accordingly, President Grant wanted persons of African descent to have a remedy in federal court, for such atrocities. Similar criminal statutes were enacted by Congress for the same Constitutional violations, in 18 U.S.C. § 241 in 1966 (conspiracy to violate Constitutional rights), and 18 U.S.C. § 242 in 1870 (violation of federal Constitutional rights under color of law.

That statute is the vehicle that is used today to sue police officers and other governmental officials. It’s literally the most used law in the United States to sue police officers for violating the federal Constitutional rights of another.

If you have been the victim of Excessive Force or a False Arrest by a police officer, please check our Section, above, entitled: What To Do If You Have Been Beaten-Up Or False Arrested By The Police. Also, please click on “Home“, above, or the other pages shown, for the information or assistance that we can provide for you. If you need to speak with a lawyer about your particular legal situation, please call the Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering for a free consultation.

Jerry L. Steering, Esq., is a Civil Rights – Police Misconduct Attorney, serving, among other places, Orange County, and the Orange County cities shown below, including in the City of Newport Beach, California. Mr. Steering has been in the Newport Beach area since 1986, and has been suing police officers for civil rights violations, and defending bogus criminal cases of crimes against police officers, for almost 29 years. The majority of the Steering law firm’s practice, is suing police officers and other government officials, for misconduct, such as false arrest, police brutality / excessive force, malicious prosecution, and other “Constitutional Torts“.

Click on “Home“, above, or the other pages shown, for the information or assistance that we can provide for you. If you need to speak with a lawyer about your particular legal situation, please call the Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering for a free telephone consultation.

Thank you, and best of luck, whatever your needs.

Jerry L. Steering, Esq.

 

 

 

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